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Tipping the Scales in Favor of
Charitable Bequests: A Critique
Elizabeth R. Carter*
I. Introduction
Public policy favors testamentary bequests to charity. At least, that
is the claim of numerous courts and legislative bodies. The policy
favoring charitable bequests may tip the scales in deciding the proper
interpretation of a will, or the merits of an undue influence, or incapacity
claim. Paradoxically, courts and legislative bodies rarely discuss the
source of this public policy.1 Nor do they inquire into the policy’s
wisdom,2 though they should.
In the coming years, we will see a staggering amount of money
change hands as a result of death—mainly thanks to the Baby Boomers.3
The Boomers will receive inheritances of about $8.4 trillion from their
own parents.4 In turn, the Boomers are expected to leave $30 trillion to
their own heirs.5 Death, it seems, is now an important part of many
financial plans. “Many boomers . . . have been lagging behind in their
*

Judge Anthony J. Graphia & Jo Ann Graphia, Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana
State University. LL.M. in Taxation, University of Alabama School of Law; J.D., Tulane
University School of Law; B.S., University of Memphis; B.A. University of Memphis.
The author thanks LSU for its generous research support and, in particular, her research
assistants: Rebecca Luster, Edward Waters, and Taheera Randolph. The author thanks
Professor Mark Glover and Professor Randy Trahan for their invaluable advice. The
author also thanks her parents, Drs. Michael and Sarah Carter for inspiring this article.
1. See, e.g., In re Stalp, 359 N.Y.S.2d 749, 753 (Surr. Ct. 1974) (“It requires no
extended discussion of local (New York) law to establish that our public policy favors
charitable giving.”); see In re Estate of Baum, 211 A.2d 522, n.2 (1965) (“It is difficult to
conceive of a Commonwealth public policy that is more fundamental or more meaningful
than its frequently restated policy of encouragement to charities and charitable giving in
the public interest.”).
2. See supra note 1.
3. Baby boomers are “[m]embers of the large generation born from 1946 to 1964 . .
. .” Baby Boomers: The Gloomiest Generation, PEW RESEARCH, (June 25, 2008),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2008/06/25/baby-boomers-the-gloomiest-generation/.
4. See METLIFE MATURE MARKET INSTITUTE, THE METLIFE STUDY OF INHERITANCE
AND WEALTH TRANSFER TO BABY BOOMERS 6 (2010) [hereinafter METLIFE].
5. See ACCENTURE, THE “GREATER” WEALTH TRANSFER: CAPITALIZING ON THE
INTERGENERATIONAL SHIFT IN WEALTH 1 (2012) [hereinafter ACCENTURE].
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savings, betting on—hoping for—big bequests, especially since many of
them suffered big losses in 2008.”6 Whether they will actually receive
those bequests is an entirely different question. Some experts believe
that increases in average life expectancy and the associated costs will
result in many Americans outliving their savings.7 But there is another
less obvious reason why would-be heirs should not count on receiving an
inheritance from their parents; charities and non-profit organizations.
Heirs are not the only ones banking on their parents’ deaths. Charities are
also relying on the Baby Boomer wealth transfer—predicting a “golden
age of philanthropy.”8 Unlike the typical heir, however, charities are in
the business of soliciting gratuitous transfers, often quite aggressively.
The potential for conflict between would-be heirs and charities should be
obvious, yet little scholarship considers the issue.
The public policy favoring testamentary bequests to charities is well
established in the law. However, that public policy can, and does,
conflict with other equally well-founded public policies. When
confronted with this conflict, courts are often dismissive or even hostile
towards the parties seeking to challenge a testamentary bequest to a
charity. I argue that the policy favoring charitable giving has gone too
far and has, in some instances, undermined other important public
policies. Specifically, courts and legislators have strengthened the
charitable bequest policy without giving enough consideration to other,
equally important public policies. This problem is not new. History
shows that similar policy conflicts have arisen periodically since late
antiquity, if not earlier. The parameters of the problem, however, are
somewhat new. The governing law, available technologies, and familial
relationships have certainly evolved since the time of late antiquity. This
article examines how the public policy favoring charitable bequests
conflicts with various aspects of the equally important public policies of
testamentary freedom and family protection.

6. Anne Tergesen, Counting on an Inheritance? Count Again., WALL ST. J., June
11,
2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303990604577370001234970954.html;
see also, Steve Rosen, Kids and Money: If You Plan to Leave an Inheritance, Manage
Expectations,
KENTUCKY.COM,
Oct.
20,
2013,
http://www.kentucky.com/2013/10/20/2885759/kids-and-money-if-you-plan-to.html.
7. Tergesen, supra note 6.
8. Richard C. Morais, Huge Wave in Charitable Giving Still Coming, FORBES (Oct.
2,
2009),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/02/estate-tax-bill-gates-boston-collegepersonal-finance-bc.html; see also Julia Love, These Days, Colleges Urge Young Alumni
to Give . . . Posthumously, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 20, 2012, at A20.
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Part II considers the competing public policies of testamentary
freedom, family protection, and charitable bequests, as well as the
existing legal doctrines aimed at furthering these policies. Part III
examines the social and legal origins of charitable bequests and the
periodic attempts to balance charitable bequests with other important
policy considerations. Part IV examines the role of the non-profit sector
in America today. Specifically, Part IV considers the size and scope of
the nonprofit industry, the legal and economic benefits the nonprofit
industry enjoys, and the manner in which nonprofits solicit charitable
bequests. Part V illustrates how the current law fails to strike the
appropriate balance between the competing policies, as the current law is
too favorable to charities and reform is needed. Part VI concludes.
II. Competing Public Policies
American law favors charitable giving, testamentary freedom, and
family protection as matters of public policy. For thousands of years
Western society struggled to strike the appropriate balance between these
competing concerns. Today, a number of laws and doctrines promote
and protect these public policy concerns.
A. Freedom of Testation
In every American jurisdiction, “[t]he first principle in the law of
wills is freedom of testation.”9 At its core, testamentary freedom means
that a “testator ‘may dispose of his property as he pleases, and that [he]
may indulge his prejudice against his relations and in favor of strangers,
and that, if he does so, it is no objection to his will.’”10 Looking to state
statutes and centuries of jurisprudence, numerous courts have described
freedom of testation as a matter of public policy.11 A variety of laws and
9. John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV.
489, 491 (1975).
10. Breeden v. Stone, 992 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Colo. 2000) (citing Lehman v.
Lindenmeyer, 109 P.956, 959 (1909)).
11. See, e.g., In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 895 (Ill. 2009) (“[O]ur
statutes clearly reveal a public policy in support of testamentary freedom.”); see also
Nat’l Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 866 (Or. 1954) (“[W]e submit that
taken together they reveal a long-accepted pattern of public attitude and public policy in
this state respecting an almost unrestricted right to dispose of one’s property on death.”);
Monroe v. Barclay, 17 Ohio St. 302, 316 (1867) (“[I]t is the policy of the law to secure to
every one the right to dispose of his property in accordance with his individual will[]”).
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doctrines protect this fundamental organizing principal. For example, in
order to exercise testamentary rights, the testator must (1) possess
testamentary capacity at the time he executes the testament, and (2)
execute the testament in compliance with the form prescribed by law.12
Although the nuances of these requirements vary by state, the object of
both is to safeguard, among other things, testamentary freedom.
Three interrelated concepts aimed at ensuring freedom of testation
are important for our purposes: (1) the doctrine of undue influence; (2)
the prohibition on a beneficiary of a testament from serving as a witness
or assisting in the preparation of the testament; and (3) related attorney
ethics rules.Undue Influence.
To ensure that the decedent’s testament represents the true
expression of his will, his testament may be set aside if it was procured
through fraud, duress, or, most commonly, undue influence.13 Although
the undue influence doctrine and the related evidentiary issues vary from
state-to-state, the essential thrust of the doctrine is to ensure freedom of
testation. Undue influence invalidates a testament executed in proper
form by a person possessing testamentary capacity because the
“testator’s free will is destroyed and, as a result, the testator does
something contrary to his ‘true’ desires.”14 Not all influence is undue.15
To be “undue” the influence must actually overcome the free agency of
the testator.16 The influence must have “so impaired the volition of the
donor as to substitute the volition of the donee or other person for the
volition of the donor.”17 In contrast, “legitimate influence” such as
“[i]nfluence obtained by kindness and affection” is not undue.18 The line
between acceptable influence and undue influence is frustratingly
difficult to ascertain in some cases and has been criticized by a number
of scholars.
To succeed on an undue influence claim, most jurisdictions require
the presence of four factors, namely: susceptibility, opportunity,
disposition, and coveted result.19 Susceptibility refers to “a person who is
susceptible of being unduly influenced by the person charged with
12. See, e.g., Dean v. Jordan, 79 P.2d 331, 335 (Wash. 1938).
13. See, e.g., THOMAS E. ATKINSON, WILLS at §54-61 ( 2d ed.) .
14. In re Estate of Rotax, 429 A.2d 1304, 1305 (Vt. 1981) (citation omitted).
15. See In re Estate of Haneberg, 14 P.3d 1088, 1096 (Kan. 2000).
16. See In re Estate of Maheras, 897 P.2d 268, 273-74 (Okla. 1995); EUNICE L.
ROSS & THOMAS J. REED, WILL CONTESTS at §7:2 ( 2d ed.) [Hereinafter WILL CONTESTS].
17. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1479 (2013).
18. See Haneberg, 14 P.3d at 1096.
19. See WILL CONTESTS, supra note 16, at §7:2.
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exercising undue influence.”20 The testator’s physical and mental
conditions are relevant in determining his susceptibility to influence.21
Often, this means the testator had some diminished physical or mental
capacity—yet he was not so diminished as to actually lack testamentary
capacity. In practice, the line between undue influence and lack of
capacity is not always clear. Facts giving rise to an undue influence
claim will typically support a lack of capacity argument as well. As a
result, both challenges are often brought together.22 Opportunity refers
to “the opportunity of the person charged to exercise such influence on
the susceptible person to procure the improper favor.”23 Disposition
means “a disposition on the part of the party charged to influence unduly
such susceptible person for the purpose of procuring an improper favor
either for himself or another.”24 Finally, a coveted result is “a result
caused by, or the effect of, such undue influence.”25 The failure of the
testator to provide for “the natural objects of the testator’s bounty[]” is
often evidence of a coveted result.26
In evaluating these factors, courts also consider whether the testator
and the alleged influencer had a confidential relationship.27 The
existence of a confidential relationship makes a finding of undue
influence more likely. Some jurisdictions require a confidential
relationship as a threshold issue in all undue influence cases.28 In the
jurisdictions that do not explicitly require a confidential relationship as
threshold issue, findings of undue influence in the absence of a
confidential relationship are unusual.29 Regardless of the specific
approach taken by any individual jurisdiction, the existence or nonexistence of a confidential relationship is a critical determination in all
undue influence cases.
One of the more challenging aspects of undue influence cases is
deciding which relationships constitute confidential relationships.
20. In re Estate of Christen, 239 N.W.2d 528, 531 (Wis. 1976) (citation omitted).
21. WILL CONTESTS, supra note 16, at §7:3.
22. See Jeffery G. Sherman, Can Religious Influence Ever Be “Undue” Influence?,
73 BROOK. L. REV. 579, 619-20 (2008).
23. Christen, 239 N.W.2d at 531 (citation omitted).
24. Id. (citation omitted).
25. Id. (citation omitted).
26. Sherman, supra note 22, at 619.
27. WILL CONTESTS, supra note 16, at §7:4.
28. See, e.g., In re Estate of Haneberg, 14 P.3d 1088, 1096 (Kan. 2000); In re Estate
of Gersbach, 960 P.2d 811, 814 (N.M. 1998).
29. WILL CONTESTS, supra note 16, at §7:4.

5

988

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:3

Generally, a confidential relationship is a “relationship of inequality”
meaning “a relationship in which the testator reposes an exceptional
degree of reliance on the integrity and loyalty of another, either because
of that other person’s knowledge or status or because of the testator’s
dependence or subservience.”30 Most jurisdictions agree that traditional
fiduciary relationships—like the attorney-client relationship or the
relationship between the holder of a power of attorney and the
grantor31—may give rise to a relationship of confidence.32 Some
jurisdictions go so far as to call fiduciary relationships “confidential per
se.”33 Confidential relationships, however, include more types of
relationships than legally recognized fiduciary relationships. Whether a
relationship constitutes a confidential relationship is a question of fact,
generally requiring proof that the relationship was either (1) a reliant
relationship or (2) a dominant-subservient relationship.34 A variety of
relationships may form the basis of confidential relationships if those
additional facts are present.
Courts have found the following
relationships, when coupled with evidence of a reliant or dominantsubservient aspect, to be confidential relationships: “a close confidential
friendship[,]”35 “a clergyman-parishioner relationship,[]”36 a caregiver
relationship,37 and a banker-customer relationship.38
1. Interested Parties
The second doctrine aimed at ensuring freedom of testation
prohibits an interested party from serving as a witness to the will or
assisting in its preparation.39 This rule “seeks to insure that testators act
free of influence from subscribing witnesses.”40 The existence of an
30. Sherman, supra note 22, at 624.
31. Medlock v. Mitchell, 234 S.W.3d 901, 905 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006); Blissard v.
White, 515 So. 2d 1196, 1199-1200 (Miss. 1987).
32. See WILL CONTESTS, supra note 16, at § 7:4; Sherman, supra note 22, at 624.
33. See, e.g., Kelley v. Johns, 96 S.W.3d 189, 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).
34. See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 22, at 624-25.
35. In re Estate of Brevard, 213 S.W.3d 298, 304 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
36. Id.
37. Bean v. Wilson, 661 S.E.2d 518, 519 (Ga. 2008).
38. Owens v. Mazzei, 847 A.2d 700 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
39. See, e.g., Triestman v. Kilgore, 838 S.W.2d 547, 547 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam)
(“A competent witness to a will is one who receives no pecuniary benefit under its
terms.”) (citation omitted).
40. In re Estate of Tkachuck, 139 Cal. Rptr. 55, 58 (Ct. App. 1977); see also In re
Estate of Johnson, 347 So. 2d 785, 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (“An obvious purpose
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interested witness or the involvement of an interested person in the
preparation of a testament typically supports a finding of undue
influence.41 Similarly, the involvement of interested parties tends to
prove that the will was executed under suspicious circumstances. The
scope and effect of the rule varies. A few states automatically purge any
bequest to a subscribing witness or notary.42 The more common
approach, in contrast, allows the bequest to stand if there are additional
disinterested witnesses.43 At least two states do not invalidate the
bequest, but by statute provide that the existence of an interested witness
creates a presumption of undue influence.44 Those states that do prohibit
bequests to interested witnesses typically seek to strike a balance
between testamentary freedom and family protection. To prevent a
family member from being disinherited simply because he witnessed the
will, many states will still allow the interested witness to receive an
intestate or other share of property.45 Another issue of some variation is
the scope of persons subject to the rule. Some states apply their rule to
both interested witnesses and the spouses of interested parties by
invalidating bequests to the spouse of a witness.46 In contrast, a number
of states expressly allow bequests to charities with which a witness is
associated.47 Some states also expressly allow a creditor to serve as a
witness.48
[of this rule], was to prevent fraud or undue influence by a witness to a will to thwart the
intention of the testatrix.”).
41. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6112 (West 2013).
42. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1582 (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-6-1 (West
2013); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-2-1 (West 2013).
43. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-102 (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-258
(West 2013); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2330 (LexisNexis 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 551:3 (2013); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.2 (McKinney 1998); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 62-2-504 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-103 (2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 853.07
(West 2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-6-112 (2013).
44. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6112; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.12.160 (WEST 2013).
45. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-102 (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-258
(West 2013); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1582 (2013); MO. REV. STAT. ANN. (West 2013);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2330 (2013); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.2 (McKinney
2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-504 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-103 (2013); WASH.
REV. CODE § 11.12.160 (2013); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-2-1 (West 2013); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 853.07 (West 2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-6-112 (2013).
46. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §45a-258 (West 2013); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1582.1
(2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:3 (2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-504 (2013); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 41-2-1 (West 2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 853.07 (West 2013).
47. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-258 (West 2013).
48. See R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §33-6-2 (West 2013); W. VA. CODE ANN. §41-2-2
(West 2013).
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2. Attorney Ethics Rules
The attorney ethics rules also seek to prevent an attorney from
negatively affecting a client’s exercise of his testamentary freedom.
Model Rule 1.8(c) prevents attorneys from preparing wills in which they
receive large gifts and from soliciting testamentary gifts from clients:
A lawyer shall not solicit any substantial gift from a
client, including a testamentary gift, or prepare on behalf
of a client an instrument giving the lawyer or a person
related to the lawyer any substantial gift unless the
lawyer or other recipient of the gift is related to the
client. For purposes of this paragraph, related persons
include a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent
or other relative or individual with whom the lawyer or
the client maintains a close, familial relationship.49
The rule imposes a duty on attorneys, for the benefit of their clients
and the profession, to refrain from engaging in any conduct that could
raise an inference of undue influence.50 “An attorney must be as careful
to avoid the appearance of evil as he is to avoid evil itself.”51 To that
end, paragraph (k) of Rule 1.8 goes further and imputes the conflict to all
other lawyers in the associated firm.52 In interpreting this rule, some
states have suggested it also applies to serving as a witness to a will.53
Paragraph (f) of Rule 1.8 is similarly aimed at protecting the client
from undue influence. Rule 1.8(f) prohibits an attorney from accepting
payment for his services from someone other than his client unless “(1)
the client gives informed consent; (2) there is no interference with the
lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or with the clientlawyer relationship; and (3) information relating to representation of a
client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.”54 In the estate-planning
49. MODEL RULES. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (1983).
50. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Lanocha, 896 A.2d 996,
998 (2006); State v. Eisenberg, 138 N.W.2d 235, 237 (Wis. 1965).
51. State v. Gulbankian, 196 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Wis. 1972).
52. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (1983).
53. See, e.g., People v. Berge, 620 P.2d 23, 27 (Colo. 1980) (en banc).
54. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8. Rule 1.6 addresses the duty of the
attorney to maintain the client’s confidentiality. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
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context, this rule is intended to prevent undue influence.55 When an
attorney is paid by a client’s testamentary-heir, the court and the public
might fairly question whether the attorney’s loyalty and independence
have been affected.56
B. Family Protection
The public policy supporting family protection also permeates the
law of wills. This policy imposes a legal and moral duty on family
members to support one another financially. Familial support obligations
have ancient roots and essentially recognize that families form an
economic unit.57 In the law of wills, several doctrines protect immediate
family members from disinheritance by a testator.
1. Spousal Share Statutes
Perhaps the most significant family protection mechanism is the
inability of a testator to fully disinherit his surviving spouse.58 With the
exceptions of most59 of the community property jurisdictions (in which
spousal protection is assured through the community property laws), and
Georgia,60 all states have elective share statutes that prevent the testator
from fully disinheriting his surviving spouse.61 In most jurisdictions
1.6.
55. See Haynes v. First Nat’l State Bank of New Jersey, 432 A.2d 890 (N.J. 1981).
56. Id.; ABA Formal Ethics Op. 02-428 (2002) (Drafting will on recommendation
of potential beneficiary who also is client).
57. See Andrew Simmonds, Amah and Eved and the Origin of Legal Rights, 46 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 516, 528 (2000-2001); John Witte, Jr., The Goods and Goals of Marriage,
76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1019, 1020-28 (2001).
58. See, e.g., Terry L. Turnipseed, Why Shouldn’t I Be Allowed to Leave My
Property to Whomever I Choose (Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Loving
the French), 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 737, 781-82 (2006); Mark Glover, Formal Execution and
Informal Revocation: Manifestations of Probate’s Family Protection Policy, 34 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 411, 415-17 (2009).
59. Louisiana, a community property state, also has an elective share statute. See
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2432 (2013).
60. GA. CODE ANN. §53-4-1 (2013) provides “A testator, by will, may make any
disposition of property that is not inconsistent with the laws or contrary to the public
policy of the state and may give all the property to strangers, to the exclusion of the
testator’s spouse and descendants.”
61. See, e.g., Glover, supra note 58, at 416-17; Kenneth Rampino, Comment,
Spousal Disinheritance in Rhode Island: Barrett v. Barrett and the (De)Evolution of the
Elective Share Law, 12 RODGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 420, 450 (2007).
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“[t]his probate doctrine allows a surviving spouse to take a legislatively
prescribed portion of the decedent spouse’s estate regardless of the terms
of the will.”62 Spousal share statutes are based on two theories of
marriage: the “partnership theory” and the “support theory.”63 “The
partnership theory of marriage recognizes that both partners have
contributed to the accumulated estate[]” and should, therefore, share in
its benefits.64 Like community property, the partnership theory of
marriage recognizes that both spouses work together and should share in
the “fruits of the marriage.”65 In contrast, “[t]he support theory
recognizes that during their joint lives, spouses owe each other mutual
duties of support, and these duties continue in some form after death in
favor of the survivor, as a claim on the decedent spouse’s estate.”66 If a
testator fails to provide for his spouse by will, then the support theory
provides the surviving spouse with a claim against his estate for financial
support.67 The support theory seeks to prevent the surviving spouse
“from becoming society’s ward by preventing impoverishment of the
surviving spouse.”68 Approaches, of course, vary by state and may
reflect one69 or both70 theories of marriage.
2. Homestead Statutes
In addition to elective share statutes, a number of jurisdictions have
homestead statutes or constitutional provisions that protect the economic
62. Glover, supra note 58, at 416.
63. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hjersted, 135 P.3d 202, 207 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006).
64. In re Estate of Antonopoulos, 993 P.2d 637, 642 (Kan. 1999); accord In re
Amundson, 621 N.W.2d 882, 886 (S.D. 2001).
65. In re Estate of Antonopoulos, 993 P.2d at 642.
66. Id; accord In re Estate of Shipman, 832 N.W.2d 335, 342-43 (S.D. 2013).
67. In re Estate of Antonopoulos, 993 P.2d at 642.
68. Williams v. Williams, 517 S.E.2d 689, 691 (S.C. 1999) (citation omitted);
accord Karsenty v. Schoukroun, 959 A.2d 1147, 1167 (Md. Ct. App. 2008) (“states
responded by passing elective share statutes to protect widows from being disinherited
and left with no reasonable means of financial support.”) (citation omitted); In re Estate
of Merkel, 618 P.2d 872, 876 (Mont. 1980) (“The primary purpose of the elective share
statutes is to insure that the surviving spouse’s needs are met, and that the spouse is not
left penniless.”) (citation omitted).
69. See, e.g., In re Estate of Shipman, 832 N.W.2d 335, 342-43 (S.D. 2013)
(holding that South Dakota statute is intended to satisfy spousal support duty);.In re
Estate of Bilse, 746 A.2d 1090, 1092 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1999) (holding that the New Jersey
statute is need based).
70. See, e.g., In re Estate of Amundson, 621 N.W.2d 882, 886 (S.D. 2001) (“Two
rationales underlie our elective share system: support and contribution.”).
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interest of the surviving spouse and/or the children of the decedent.
Broadly, there are two types of homestead statutes: family home statutes
and fixed sum statutes. Family home statutes protect the interest of a
surviving spouse and children in the family home.
As a matter of public policy, the purpose of [these
statutes] is to promote the stability and welfare of the
state by securing to the householder a home, so that the
homeowner and his or her heirs may live beyond the
reach of financial misfortune and the demands of
creditors . . . .71
The family home statutes, therefore, recognize the significant
emotional and economic interests a decedent’s spouse and children have
in the family home.72 A number of the family home-type homestead
statutes allow the surviving spouse and/or minor children to remain in
the family home even if the testator leaves the home to some other
person.73 The property rights conferred by this right, and their duration,
vary by state.74 Homestead statutes further protect the surviving spouse
and children by exempting the family home from seizure and sale by
creditors.75
The fixed sum-type homestead statutes, in contrast, give the
surviving spouse and dependent children a claim to a fixed sum of
money from the decedent’s estate rather than rights to real estate.76 The
sum of money is ordinarily fixed by statute and is quite modest.77 The
policy considerations behind the fixed sum statutes are similar to the
family home statutes.78 To that end, the sum of money that the surviving
spouse and children receive under the applicable homestead statute is

71. Pub. Health Trust of Dade Cnty. v. Lopez, 531 So. 2d 946, 948 (Fla. 1988).
72. In re Estate of Bonde, 694 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005).
73. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-402 (West 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §
30-16-02 (West 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 58 § 311 (West 2013); TEX. ESTATES CODE §
102.005 (West 2013); see also Snyder v. Davis, 699 So. 2d 999, 1001-02 (Fla. 1997).
74. See supra note 73.
75. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-402(c) (West 2013); Pub. Health Trust of
Dade Cnty., 531 So. 2d at 946, 947; Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1001-02.
76. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-412 (2013).
77. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-110 (2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2402
(2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-402 (2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-412; MO. ANN.
STAT. § 474.290 (West 2013).
78. See Carter v. Coxwell, 479 So. 2d 1181, 1183 (Ala. 1985).
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usually exempt from the claims of the decedent’s creditors.79
3. Family Allowance Statutes
Family allowance statutes offer the testator’s surviving spouse and
minor children some additional protections. These statutes generally
give the surviving spouse and minor children the right to receive a timelimited allowance for their support during the administration of the
testator’s estate.80 “[T]he family allowance [is] a statutory creation
designed to provide sustenance for the family during the settlement of
the estate . . . .”81 Most family allowance statutes limit the time period of
the support to one year.82 Unlike other family protection mechanisms,
family allowances typically fall within the discretion of the courts.83 In
determining whether a spouse or child is entitled to an allowance, courts
consider a variety of factors to determine need including age, health,
previous standard of living, value of the estate, and the value of other
resources available to the claimant.84 If a court does decide to award a
family allowance, the payment is typically made in priority to other
debts.85
4. Undue Influence as Family Protection
Courts sometimes use the doctrine of undue influence to invalidate
testaments that fail to provide for the testator’s immediate family. Thus,
undue influence operates to ensure freedom of testation and, in some
instances, family protection. Professor Melanie Leslie examined a
number of undue influence cases and observed:

79. See supra note 73.
80. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2404 (2013); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6540
(West 2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2403 (West 2013); MO. ANN. STAT. §
474.260 (West 2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-414 (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B,
§ 2-404 (2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-404 (West 2013).
81. In re Estate of Seymour, 671 N.W.2d 109, 113 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted); accord Parson v. Parson, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 686, 687 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996).
82. See supra note 77.
83. See supra note 77; see also In re Estate of Hamilton, 869 P.2d 971, 978 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994); In re Estate of Butler, 607 P.2d 956, 959 (Ariz. 1980).
84. In re Estate of Hamilton, 869 P.2d at 978; MO. ANN. STAT. § 474.260 (West
2013).
85. See Parson, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 687.
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Although the opinions studied habitually recited that a
court’s sole purpose is to effectuate the testator’s true
intentions, a closer inspection reveals that a significant
number of courts employed a governing rule less
concerned with divining testamentary intent than with
determining whether the reason behind the disposition
was justifiable in the court’s view. Courts were much
more likely to honor testamentary intent when the will
provided for family members as opposed to nonrelatives.86
Several aspects of the undue influence doctrine facilitate courts in
protecting the testator’s family. If a court invalidates a testament on
undue influence grounds, then the decedent’s property will generally
pass under the laws of intestacy—which will benefit his surviving spouse
and immediate relatives.87 Two important aspects of the undue influence
doctrine are easily seen as family protection mechanisms: the
confidential relationship requirement and the coveted result/unnatural
bequest requirement.
The existence of a confidential relationship between the testator and
the influencer is a threshold issue in most undue influence cases.88
Family members benefit from this requirement because courts are
hesitant to find family members in a confidential relationship with each
other—thus, it is less likely for a testament to be invalidated due to the
influence of a close relative. Courts struggle to fit family relationships
into the confidential relationship framework—particularly spousal
relationships and parent-child relationships. In practice, “[c]ourts are
reluctant to find a confidential relationship among spouses and blood
relatives.”89 “[The] failure to find a confidential relationship in the
context of the family is not because family relationships lack the
characteristics of dependence and reliance—indeed it is these very
characteristics that are the hallmark of the family relationship.”90 The

86. Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 30 ARIZ. L. REV, 235,
243-44 (1996) (footnote omitted).
87. See Ray Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571, 611
(1997).
88. See infra Part II.A.1.
89. See Madoff, supra note 87 at 602.
90. See id. at 603.
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analysis is often complicated when children or spouses stand in positions
that courts often view as confidential relationships—in particular,
caregivers and power of attorney holders.91 In the spousal context, courts
take a variety of approaches. At least one court explicitly held that the
“relationship between a husband and wife is a confidential relationship . .
. .”92 Other courts recognize that result is harsh in light of the evidentiary
function of the existence of a confidential relationship. Some courts
specifically hold that the spousal relationship, although confidential in
nature, does not necessarily carry the same evidentiary presumptions as
other confidential relationships.93 As one court explained:
Although it has been said that a proper relationship
between a husband and wife is often a ‘fiduciary’ or
‘confidential’ relationship, something beyond this
normal spousal relationship must exist before a
‘fiduciary’ or ‘confidential’ relationship can be found for
the purposes of a claim of undue influence.94
Courts are reluctant to find a confidential relationship even where
one spouse is acting as the caregiver for the other spouse, managing his
financial affairs, or involved in the preparation of his testament—all facts
which would ordinarily support a finding of undue influence.95 Parentchild relationships are equally challenging. Courts are reluctant to find

91. See infra Part V.B.1.
92. Medlock v. Mitchell, 234 S.W.3d 901, 905 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006).
93. See In re Estate of Langston v. Williams, 57 So. 3d 618, 622 (Miss. 2011);
accord Jacobs v. Vaillancourt, 634 So. 2d 667, 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (“The
confidential relationship which exists between a husband and wife is not one which may
be considered in the law governing will contests.”); see also Keasler v. Estate of Keasler,
973 S.W.2d 213, 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (“[T]he mere fact that one spouse exercises
great influence over the affairs of life as well as home and domestic concerns is
insufficient to raise a presumption of invalidity of the will.”).
94. Ruestman v. Ruestman, 111 S.W. 3d 464, 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); accord, In
re Estate of Baumgarten, 975 N.E.2d 651, 657 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (“[T]he law does not
and should not presume . . . undue influence . . . because the spouse has been able
throughout the marriage to have considerable influence on her spouse.”) (quoting another
source).
95. See, e.g., Ruestman, 111 S.W.3d at 479 (finding no evidence of a confidential
relationship between decedent and his wife despite wife serving as decedent’s primary
caretaker); In re Estate of Mowdy, 973 P.2d 345, 349 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998) (finding no
undue influence on part of wife who was previously decedent’s legal secretary where
white personally typed decedent’s will).
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that these relationships are confidential relationships,96 even where a
child is serving in a relationship that is ordinarily classified as a
confidential or fiduciary relationship.97
The coveted result/unnatural bequest aspect of the undue influence
analysis also tends to serve a family protection function because it often
makes it easier for family members to prove a case of undue influence
perpetrated by a non-relative. Courts presume that testators will
normally leave their property to their spouse and close blood relatives.98
This viewpoint makes it easier for a testator’s family to establish an
undue influence case whenever a testator omits family in favor of a third
party. Some courts essentially require a finding of some “unnatural”
disposition in order to establish an undue influence claim.99 “[T]he
establishment of the fact that the testament executed would not have
been executed but for such influence is generally predicated upon a
consideration of whether the testament executed is unnatural in its terms
of disposition of property.”100 In jurisdictions where a finding of
96. See, e.g., Pyle v. Sayers, 34 S.W.3d 786, 789 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000) (“The
influence of children over parents is legitimate so long as they do not extend a positive
dictation and control over the mind of the testator.”); Bills v. Lindsay, 909 S.W.2d 434,
440 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (“A normal relationship between a mentally competent parent
and an adult child is not per se a confidential relationship and it raises no presumption of
invalidity of the transaction.”).
97. See, e.g., Eddleman v. Estate of Farmer, 740 S.W.2d 141, 142-43 (Ark. 1987)
(finding no undue influence on part of daughter/caretaker of decedent who left his estate
to her and no property to his other daughter); Jacobs v. Vaillancourt, 634 So. 2d 667, 671
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (finding no undue influence on son-in-law who prepared will
for testator which substantially benefitted testator’s daughter and son-in-law’s wife);
Carter v. Carter, 526 So. 2d 141, 143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (describing sons’ role in
helping mother execute a will as “the acts of dutiful sons who helped their mother draw
up her will and execute it” rather than “active procurement”); Estate of McCorkle v.
Beason, 27 So. 3d 1180, 1186 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (finding no undue influence or
confidential relationship between daughter and testator even though daughter held power
of attorney for father, shared a bank account and safe deposit box with father, discussed
will with father and then typed it for him); In re Estate of Angle, 777 A.2d 114, 123 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2001) (“A parent-child relationship does not establish the existence of a
confidential relationship nor does the fact that the proponent has a power of attorney
where the decedent wanted the proponent to act as attorney-in-fact.”); In re Estate of
Jakiella, 510 A2d 815, 817 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding that neither parent-child
relationship nor child’s appointment of attorney-in-fact for mother required a finding of a
confidential relationship).
98. See Leslie, supra note 86, at 245-46.
99. See, e.g., Baxter v. Grasso, 740 N.E.2d 1048, 1051 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (“It is
settled law that to constitute undue influence, four factors must be satisfied: (1) [an]
unnatural disposition has been made . . . .”) (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in
original).
100. In re Estate of Johnson, 340 S.W.3d 769, 783 (Tex. App. 2011) (quoting

15

998

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:3

suspicious circumstances is required to support a claim of undue
influence, courts typically consider unnatural dispositions as evidence of
suspicious circumstances.101 Still, other courts consider an unnatural
disposition as one of several factors that can support an undue influence
claim.102 The naturalness of a disposition is typically established if the
testator, for no apparent reason, left his property to someone other than
the natural objects of his bounty.103 The testator’s spouse and intestate
heirs are, generally, the persons deemed to be the natural objects of his
bounty.104 Regardless of the stated evidentiary significance in a
particular jurisdiction, unnatural dispositions are often dispositive in
undue influence cases. In the course of her study, Professor Leslie
observed that “many of the opinions dealing with contested gifts to nonrelatives concentrated . . . on whether, in the court’s opinion the gift to a
non-relative was justifiable.”105 She further observed that:
a significant number of courts confronted with wills that
disinherited family members in favor of non-family
members upheld or imposed findings of undue influence
based on minimal evidence, or evidence that would be
insufficient to meet the contestant’s burden of proof in a
case where the will’s primary beneficiaries were nonrelatives[.]106
C. Charitable Giving
The law of wills also furthers the more general public policy
favoring charitable giving.

another source); accord Rostanzo v. Rostanzo, 900 N.E.2d 101, 114 (Mass. App. Ct.
2009) (noting that one of the facts supporting an undue influence claim is an unnatural
disposition); Ruestman v. Ruestman, 111 S.W.3d 464, 481 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (“An
important consideration in determining whether undue influence has occurred is whether
the disposition of the property was ‘unnatural’.”).
101. See, e.g., Slusarenko v. Slusarenko, 147 P.3d 920, 930 (Or. Ct. App. 2006)
(“The following factors may constitute suspicious circumstances . . . (6) an unnatural or
unfair disposition of property.”).
102. See In re Estate of Graham, 69 S.W.3d 598, 610 (Tex. App. 2001).
103. See Ruestman, 111 S.W.3d at 481.
104. See id.
105. Leslie, supra note 86, at 246.
106. Id. at 245.
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1. Identification of Beneficiaries
Generally, a testament must identify the testator’s beneficiaries with
reasonable certainty.107 The testator does not have to use any particular
language, however, the “beneficiary must be capable of identification . . .
.”108 “If the writing is so uncertain or confused or ambiguous that the
testator’s intentions cannot be reasonably ascertained, it is void as a
testamentary instrument.”109 This rule is often relaxed in the case of
charitable bequests. Because gifts to charity are favored, “a charitable
disposition in a will must be liberally construed to uphold its validity.”110
Both statutes111 and jurisprudence recognize “the validity of charitable
bequests that do not specify the charity, or even the general charitable
purpose.”112 If the testator sufficiently expresses his desire that his
property be used for charitable purposes, then the bequest will stand and
the executor or trustee may select the particular charities that will receive
property.113
2. Capacity to Inherit; Lapse
Courts often refuse to apply the doctrine of lapse to charitable
bequests, which further advances the public policy favoring these
bequests. A bequest to a person that dies or ceases to exist prior to the
date of the decedent’s death will lapse.114 When a legacy lapses, it may
pass to another legatee under the express terms of the will, to another
person under an anti-lapse statute, or pass to the decedent’s heirs in
107. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 229 S.W.2d 743, 775 (Ky. Ct. App. 1950) (“The
law permits one to dispose of his property by will, but the intention of the testator must
be expressed with sufficient clarity to enable a court to enforce its provisions.”).
108. Smoot v. McCandless, 461 S.W.2d 776, 782 (Mo. 1970).
109. Johnson, 229 S.W.2d at 775; accord Holcomb v. Newton, 226 S.W.2d 670
(Tex. App. 1950); Uloth v. Little, 73 N.E.2d 459 (Mass. 1947).
110. In re Estate of Clementi, 82 Cal. Rptr.3d 685, 692 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
111. See e.g. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-515 (West 2013); Ga. CODE ANN. § 534-62 (West 2013); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1572 (2013).
112. In re Estate of Clementi, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 692; accord Marshal v. Trust Co. of
Ga., 202 S.E.2d 94, 97 (Ga. 1973); In re Estate of Staab, 173 N.W.2d 866, 871 (Iowa
1970) (“Courts generally subscribe to the view that charitable bequests shall not be
permitted to fail or lapse for lack of definiteness as to the purpose of the bequest.”).
113. In re Estate of Clementi, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 692.
114. See, e.g., In re Estate of Micheel, 577 N.W.2d 407, 409 (Iowa 1998); Niemann
v. Zacharias, 176 N.W.2d 671, 673-74 (Neb. 1970); In re Estate of Haugen, 794 N.W.2d
448, 450-51 (N.D. 2011).
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intestacy.115 Charitable organizations do not “die” per se, but they do
sometimes cease to exist. An existing organization may merge with
another organization, may cease operations, or may fully dissolve prior
to the death of the testator.116
When a charitable organization named in a will no longer exists on
the date of a decedent’s death, the doctrine of lapse should apply.117 In
practice, however, courts feel “obliged to ensure that the testator’s
charitable intent is enforced” notwithstanding the non-existence of the
charitable beneficiary.118 If the charitable organization no longer exists
and has no successor organization, courts may invoke the doctrine of cy
près and distribute the legacy to other charitable organizations with
similar purposes.119
3. Conditions
Courts sometimes relieve charitable bequests from the rules
governing failure of a condition. When a testator makes a bequest
subject to a condition, the courts will generally enforce the condition as
written. If the condition fails, is not satisfied, or is impossible, the
bequest should lapse.120 In the charitable context, however, courts are
more lenient. When a testator gives property to a charity and directs its
use for a particular purpose, courts will often ignore the condition or
construe the condition to be merely precatory in nature.121 In In re
Fairchild, for example, the testator made the following bequest:

115. See, e.g., In re Estate of Haugen, 794 N.W.2d at 451; see also In re Estate of
Hanna, 919 So. 2d 104, 106 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005); In re Estate of Harper, 975 A.2d
1155, 1159 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009).
116. See Crisp Area YMCA v. Nationsbank, N.A., 526 S.E.2d 63, 66 (Ga. 2000)
(charitable organization that was inactive on the date of decedent’s death allowed to
inherit); Gustafson v. Wesley Found., 469 S.E.2d 160, 162 (Ga. 1996) (charitable
organization transferred all of its assets to another organization).
117. E.g., In re Estate of Brunzel, 51 N.Y.S. 2d 483, 484 (Surr. Ct. 1944); In re
Estate of Flathers, 288 P. 231, 232 (Wash. 1930).
118. Gustafson, 469 S.E.2d at 162.
119. See In re Estate of Leventhal, 212 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476-77 (Surr. Ct. 1961); R.I.
Assoc. for Blind v. Nugent, 206 A.2d 527, 530-31 (R.I. 1965).
120. See In re Estate of Hirschberg, 112 N.Y.S.2d 919, 920-21 (Surr. Ct. 1952);
Bank One Trust Co. v. Resident Home Ass’n for Mentally Retarded, No. 19660, 2003
WL 21674987 (Ohio Ct. App. July 18, 2003).
121. See In re Will of Fairchild, 178 N.Y.S.2d 886, 888-89 (Surr. Ct. 1958); U.S.
Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Rhilander, 677 P.2d 745, 745 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
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I give a one-fiftieth part to each of the seven following
named persons and corporations, absolutely, provided, in
each case, that she or it survive me: . . . (2) Hopewell
Society, having its place of business at Number 218
Gates Avenue, Brooklyn, New York (the said fund to be
used for the benefit of the Gould Guest House now
situated at Number 27 Monroe Street, Brooklyn, New
York).122
Several legatees argued that the legacy lapsed because the Gould
Guest House no longer existed and, therefore, the condition could not be
fulfilled.123 The court, however, reasoned that “[t]he parenthetical words
following the absolute legacy are apparently indicative of the testator’s
desire that so long as the Society conducted Gould Guest House the fund
was to be used for that purpose.124 Because the Gould Guest House no
longer existed, the legatee was “free to use the fund in any manner within
its general charitable functions.”125 Similarly, in Rubel v. Friend, the
testator made a charitable bequest in trust and directed that the trustees
use his residuary estate to establish and maintain a convalescent home
within ten years of his death.126 The trustees failed to comply with the
terms of the testament within the ten-year time frame.127 The court
determined that the failure of the trustees to meet the condition did not
cause the bequest to lapse because “[e]quity considers the general
charitable purpose of the testator or donor as the substance of the devise
or gift . . . .”128 A charitable bequest, in the view of the court, “will not
be permitted to lapse or be defeated by the mere expiration of time or
because there cannot be a literal compliance with its provision.” 129
Statutes in a number of jurisdictions now expressly give courts the
authority to distribute property in accordance with the testator’s general
charitable intent while striking problematic conditions.130

122. Fairchild, 178 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
123. Id. at 889.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 888.
126. Rubel v. Friend, 101 N.E.2d 445, 452 (Ill. App. Ct. 1951).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 448.
129. Id. at 449.
130. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12 § 3541 (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-22a01
(2013); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7740.3 (2013).
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III. Evolution of Charitable Bequests and Competing Public Policies
Throughout history, the law of wills has attempted to strike the
appropriate balance between testamentary freedom and family
protection; as soon as the law allowed charitable bequests, that balance
was affected. The church—at one time the only sizeable charitable
organization—repeatedly inserted itself in the dying process and the
process of preparing and administering wills. Each time this occurred,
the church benefitted financially at the expense of testamentary freedom,
family protection, and the public image of the church. For centuries,
societies have struggled to find the appropriate balance and have
periodically checked the power of the church in the dying and willmaking process. Today, however, the problem is not limited to religious
organizations. Both religious and secular charities are aggressively
seeking involvement in the testamentary process in hopes of financial
benefit. History shows the need for legislative and judicial response.
A. Evolution of the Competing Policies from Late Antiquity through the
Middle Ages
The challenging public policy questions raised by encouraging
testamentary bequests to charity can be traced back to late antiquity. As
the U.S. Supreme Court succinctly explained:
Charities had their origin in the great command, to love
thy neighbor as thyself. But when the Emperor
Constantine permitted his subjects to bequeath their
property to the church, it was soon abused; so much so,
that afterwards, when it became too common to give
land to religious uses, consistently with the free
circulation of property, the supreme authority of every
nation in Europe, where Christianity prevailed, found it
necessary to limit such devises by statutes of
mortmain.131
The Court’s summation oversimplifies matters. Inheritance laws
are an ancient concept. Default schemes of intestacy are found in,

131. Perin v. Carey, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 465, 498 (1860).
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among other sources, the Code of Hammurabi,132 biblical texts,133 and the
Aztec society.134 However, the testament as we think of it today—an
instrument allowing a person to direct the distribution of his property as
he sees fit—appears to be a creation of Roman law.135 Under the law of
the Twelve Tables, Roman citizens enjoyed full testamentary freedom in
the sense that they could dispose of the entirety of their estates at
death.136 Prior to the Twelve Tables, property passed from one male to
the “next of kin in the male line.”137 The law set forth in the Twelve
Tables allowed greater freedom, but it still attempted to strike a balance
between freedom of testation and rules of public order:
The absolute power of bequest, conferred on every
citizen by the Twelve Tables, was a concession to the
people. The transfer of property by will at this time
being an event which, in a small state, might materially
affect the well being of the community, was an act of
legislation to which publicity was requisite.138
Roman law was highly formalistic. “The Roman law sought to
ascertain, fix and determine the true declaration of the last will of a
testator, by surrounding that declaration by such safeguards as to forbid
the possibility of fraud or the perversion of the testator’s intention in the
solemn act of testamentation.”139 To that end, Roman testaments
required a certain number of competent witnesses—none of whom could
be named as an heir or related to an heir named in the testament.140 In
addition to requiring publicity and other form requirements, the law
restricted the persons a testator could name as an heir or legatee.
132. See Robert C. Ellickson & Charles Dia Thorland, Ancient Land Law:
Mesopotamia, Egypt, Israel, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 366-67 (1995).
133. See generally Calum Carmichael, Inheritance in Biblical Sources, 20 L. &
LITERATURE 229 (2008).
134. See Francisco Avalos, An Overview of the Legal System of the Aztec Empire,
86 L. LIBR. J. 259 (1994).
135. See WILL CONTESTS, supra note 16, at §2:1.
136. See JOHN GEORGE PHILLIMORE, PRIVATE LAW AMONG THE ROMANS FROM THE
PANDECTS 352 (1863) [hereinafter PRIVATE LAW AMONG THE ROMANS].
137. JOHN GEORGE PHILLIMORE, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY AND HISTORY OF THE
ROMAN LAW 121 (1848).
138. Id.
139. MOSES A. DROPSIE, ROMAN LAW OF TESTAMENTS, CODICILS, AND GIFTS IN THE
EVENT OF DEATH, 2 (1892).
140. See id. at 80-81.

21

1004

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:3

Importantly, for our purposes, Roman law required that the testator name
a definite and identifiable heir who was a natural person.141
Corporations, societies and other juridical persons could not be named as
heirs or legatees.142 Nor could the testator leave his property to “the
poor” or for other general pious or charitable causes.143 Policy concerns
eventually resulted in additional restrictions on testamentary freedom
that served family protection functions. For example, testators could
only disinherit certain heirs—”necessarius haeres”—if there was a valid
legal cause for disinherison.144
The spread of Christianity forever changed the law. In 313 A.D.,
Constantine’s Edict of Milan specifically recognized the right of the
church to own property as a corporation.145 A few years later,
Constantine gave Roman citizens the right to leave their estates to “‘any
of the most sacred and venerable Catholic churches’”146 rather than to
their own families. Very few other juridical persons or indefinite heirs
could receive testamentary bequests of property. This practice was soon
abused and corrupted.147 Romans would leave all of their property to the
church, to the detriment of their children, other relatives, and creditors.148
The church became an incredibly powerful influence in the dying
process.149 This is not particularly surprising. Fear of death and the
desire for immortality are universal human characteristics150 and the
church offered the promise of immortality for believers.151

141. See id. at 49.
142. See id.; PRIVATE LAW AMONG THE ROMANS, supra note 136, at 343-44.
143. See DROPSIE, supra note 139, at 126; PRIVATE LAW AMONG THE ROMANS,
supra note 136, at 343-44.
144. PRIVATE LAW AMONG THE ROMANS, supra note 136, at 354.
145. See EDICT OF MILAN, in Lactantius, De mortibus persecutorum, ch. 48,
translated in 4 TRANSLATIONS AND REPRINTS FROM THE ORIGINAL SOURCES OF EUROPEAN
HISTORY 28-30 (1897-1907), available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/edictmilan.html.
146. WILLIAM K. BOYD, THE ECCLESIASTICAL EDICTS OF THE THEODOSIAN CODE 82
(1905),
available
at
http://openlibrary.org/books/OL6965693M/The_ecclesiastical_edicts_of_the_Theodosian
_code.
147. Id. at 83.
148. Id. at 84.
149. See id.
150. See, e.g., SHELDON SOLOMON, JEFF GREENBERG & TOM PYSZCZYNSKI, PRIDE
AND PREJUDICE: FEAR OF DEATH AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, 9 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE NO. 6, 201 (2000).
151. See e.g. Nancy Murphy, Immortality Versus Resurrection in the Christian
Tradition, 1234 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 76, 77 (2011)
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Following the fall of the Western Roman Empire and the resulting
political power vacuum, the church assumed an even greater role in the
testamentary process.152 Testamentary bequests to the church became
compulsory rather than simply permitted. The church combined the final
confession with the act of directing the distribution of property at
death.153 In the West, the church established its own form for executing
a testament in accordance with Canon law.154 These testaments had to be
executed in the presence of a priest or other religious official—but were
otherwise lacking many of the formalities required by Roman law. 155
The church worked to abolish many aspects of the Roman law aimed at
protecting the freedom of the testator—such as the requirement of
disinterested witnesses—in order to enhance the likelihood that the
church would benefit from a will.156 “[M]any councils in France,
England, and Spain made it a law for the laity, that they should not
testamentate otherwise than in the presence of their priests.”157 The last
testament and the last confession were both part of the same act and that
act required the presence of a priest.158 Thus, the members of the clergy
were the only people capable of receiving testaments in the first place.159
Naturally, these testaments, often delivered orally, contained significant
bequests to the church. The church offered salvation and immortality,
but at a literal monetary price.160 “One needs to go but little way into the
documentary history of the period from the fifth to the fifteenth centuries
of our era, to find abundant examples of the way in which men bought
their peace with Heaven . . . .”161
In 597, Pope Gregory I sent Augustus to England to help spread

152. WILL CONTESTS, supra note 16, at §2.1.
153. FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, Book II, 318-19 (2d ed. 1898).
154. See DROPSIE, supra note 139, at 126.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative
Reform: An Examination of the New Uniform Probate Code “Harmless Error” Rule and
the Movement Toward Amorphism, 43 FLA. L. REV. 167, 188 (1991); James Findley,
Note, The Debate Over Nonlawyer Probate Judges: A Historical Perspective, 61 ALA. L.
REV. 1143, 1150 (2010).
159. Barbara R. Hauser, The Tale of the Testament, 12 PROB. & PROP. 58, 62
(1998).
160. Joseph Willard, Illustrations of the Origin of Cy Près, 8 HARV. L. REV. 69, 79
(1894).
161. Id. at 73..
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Christianity.162 Soon, “the clergy had obtained enormous power, and in a
great measure controlled the government, which, from their education
and knowledge, they were peculiarly qualified to administer.”163 The
Roman clergy were often the only men qualified to act as lawyers “and
they exercised the profession of religion and law for centuries before
these vocations were severed and performed by different classes of
persons.”164 The church took control of the probate system as well as the
execution of testaments.165 Testators needed the help of a priest to
execute testaments. The church, in turn, was responsible for interpreting
and enforcing the terms of those testaments.166
Feudalism and primogeniture resulted in a division of inheritance
systems in England. Land transferred to the oldest son by operation of
law and the church had only a limited ability to obtain land by
testamentary bequest.167 The church, however, controlled the system
governing the transfer of chattels at death. Initially, the church asserted
jurisdiction over wills that left chattels for religious or pious uses.168
Because testators customarily left a third of their chattels to the church,
the church essentially asserted jurisdiction over all testate estates.169 The
church eventually “asserted a right to oversee the goods of men who died
without wills” as well.170 If a man died intestate, then, in the view of the
church he also died without his last confession.171 When this occurred, it
fell to the church to use the chattels of the deceased to do what it could to
help his soul.172 By the thirteenth century, ecclesiastical courts held
exclusive jurisdiction over probate and similar matters.173
Testaments proved to be a lucrative business for the clergy from the
fall of the Western Roman Empire through at least the sixteenth
century.174 The clergy “introduced the mode of disposing estates after
death by testament, and as they were the only persons capable of drafting
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See DROPSIE, supra note 139, at 2-3.
See id. at 3.
See id. at 5.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 2-5.
See, e.g., Findley, supra note 158, at 1150.
See, e.g., id.
Id. at 1150.
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 153, at 357.
Id.
See, e.g., Findley, supra note 158, at 1150.
DROPSIE, supra note 139, at 5.
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such instruments, and as they had the care of the souls of the testators . . .
generous provisions were made for the church, which became greatly
enriched.”175 Conflict was inevitable.
B. Competing Policies in England
The church acquired massive land holdings in England.176 Although
primogeniture made it difficult for the church to receive land in a
testamentary bequest, feudalism actually provided the church with an
even better opportunity to add to its real estate holdings. “It seems that
whenever possible poor freemen preferred to grant their land to the
monasteries for protection rather than to the rich landowners.”177 The
church offered more agreeable terms then other feudal lords.178 “[T]he
terms of service exacted of a vassal by the Church were less burdensome
and . . . the monks not only promised him protection but also assured him
that they would intercede for his happiness after death.”179 The other
feudal lords were unhappy with this arrangement. In their view,
excessive property ownership by corporations (and churches in
particular) was inherently problematic because it removed property from
the stream of commerce.180 The feudal aristocracy worried that inter
vivos donations of property to juridical persons allowed people to avoid
their feudal services to the detriment of the feudal lords and the nation as
a whole.181 In response, England enacted a series of “mortmain”
(literally “dead hand”) statutes beginning with the Magna Charta in 1215
in an effort to recalibrate the competing policy concerns.182 The Magna
Charta provided that “no land would thereafter be alienated except so as
to retain the services due to the lord of the fees.”183 Those restrictions
175. Id.
176. HENRY P. TRAWICK, JR., TRAWICK’S REDFEARN WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN
FLORIDA, app. A § 1:2 (2012-13 ed.).
177. Id.
178. See A. H. Oosterhoff, The Law of Mortmain: An Historical and Comparative
Review, 27 U. TORONTO L.J. 257, 266-69 (1977).
179. TRAWICK, supra note 176, at app. A § 1:3.
180. See, e.g., Shirley Norwood Jones, The Demise of Mortmain in the United
States, 12 MISS. C. L. REV. 407, 407-09 (1992); Oosterhoff, supra note 178, at 265-69.
181. See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 22, at 583-88; Oosterhoff, supra note 178, at
265-69; L.S. Bristowe, The Legal Restrictions on Gifts to Charity, 7 L. Q. REV. 262, 26667 (1891).
182. See, e.g., John R. Cunningham, Mortmain Statutes: The Dead Hand Still
Survives, 27 IDAHO L. REV. 49, 49-50 (1990); Bristowe, supra note 181, at 266-67 (1891).
183. Oosterhoff, supra note 178, at 267.
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soon proved insufficient and a new statute—the Great Charter of 1217—
was enacted.184 That act was broader in scope than the Magna Charta
and provided a procedural mechanism for enforcement.185 The 1217 act
also proved somewhat ineffective and was followed by the 1279 Statute
of Mortmain, which attempted to expand the scope of the prohibition.186
Family protection was not a major concern initially because existing
laws and customs protected the family.187 A man’s land devolved to the
eldest son by operation of law under primogeniture, with a life interest,
or dower, over a portion of those lands going to his widow.188 Wills
dealt with a testator’s chattels, but often just confirmed the default
tripartite rule of chattel division.189 If a man had both children and a wife
then he could only dispose of one-third of his chattels by testament.190
The remaining two-thirds formed the “reserve” or “legitime” belonging
to the widow and children. The surviving widow received one-third, and
the remaining one-third was divided between the testator’s children.191
These rules varied somewhat by region and over time—but their general
thrust remained the same.192 The testator’s wife and children were
entitled to a reserve or legitime that was some fraction of the testator’s
estate.193 The testator could direct the remaining disposable portion of
his estate to someone other than his wife and children.194 In practice,
however, that disposable portion went to the church either by custom or
ecclesiastical law.195 Testamentary freedom became virtually extinct.196
The early mortmain statutes were simply not aimed at protecting the

184. See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 22, at 587.
185. See Oosterhoff, supra note 178, at 267.
186. Id.
187. See ATKINSON, supra note 13, at 14-15; Orrin K. McMurray, Liberty of
Testation and Some Modern Limitations Thereon, 14 ILL. L. REV. 96, 110 (1919).
188. See George L. Haskins, The Development of the Common Law Dower, 62
HARV. L. REV. 42, 53 (1948).
189. See Joseph Dainow, Limitations on Testamentary Freedom in England, 25
CORNELL L. REV. 337, 342 (1940).
190. Id. at 341.
191. Id.
192. See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 153, at 348-50; Thomas E. Atkinson,
Brief History of English Testamentary Jurisdiction, 8 MO. L. REV. 107, 114-15 (1943)
[hereinafter Atkinson, Brief History].
193. See Dainow, supra note 189, at 341-44.
194. See id. at 341-44.
195. See id. at 341.
196. Id.
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testator’s family.197 Rather, the early mortmain statutes sought to strike
the proper balance between the power of the church and the interest of
society as a whole.198 The power struggle between the church and the
aristocracy continued over the years.199 In response to the 1279 Statute
of Mortmain, the ecclesiastical courts adopted the civil law concept of
“uses” which essentially allowed the church to obtain the enjoyment of
even more land and to circumvent the mortmain statutes.200 In the 1500s,
King Henry VIII actively used the powers granted to him under the
various mortmain statutes to usurp the power of the Catholic Church and
its landholdings in England.201 Parliament enacted the Statute of Uses,
which invalidated the concept of uses that the church had used to its
advantage in earlier years.202 Yet, the reign of King Henry VIII and the
Reformation actually coincided with a change in public attitude
regarding charitable giving—particularly secular giving.203 “[S]everal
legislative enactments during this time encouraged private philanthropy,
especially in the areas of education and the relief of the poor, sick, and
aged.”204 These two developments were not necessarily inconsistent.
The religious houses had, to some extent, served the poor and needy
prior to the Reformation.205 By encouraging private—but not necessarily
religious—philanthropy, the state sought “to prevent the poor, the aged,
and others from becoming a burden on the state . . . .” 206 Queen
Elizabeth I continued this trend during her reign.207 The English legal
system showed an increasingly favorable attitude towards charitable
secular giving in the following years and the early mortmain statutes
were eventually weakened and repealed.208 Legislation enacted in 1703
essentially repealed any remaining mortmain statutes and created a new
197. See, e.g., Bristowe, supra note 181, at 268.
198. Id.
199. See Atkinson, Brief History, supra note 192, at 112-14.
200. TRAWICK, supra note 176, at app. A § 1:3 (“Under this system, the owner
simply conveyed the legal title to his land to some person or corporation for the benefit of
some named usee; the usee could be such owner himself. The usee then held the equitable
title and could convey it . . . . Under this system of uses, wills of land could be made, as
the use was not considered as land, though it was the only valuable feature of it.”).
201. See Sherman, supra note 22, at 589.
202. TRAWICK, supra note 176, at app A § 1:3.
203. Oosterhoff, supra note 178, at 274.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 275.
208. See id.
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and powerful charitable corporation called “Queen Anne’s Bounty.”209
“Queen Anne’s Bounty” had a decidedly religious purpose. The queen,
who pressured parliament to enact the legislation, sought to rebuild and
strengthen the church in the wake of the Reformation.210 To that end,
“Queen Anne’s Bounty” earmarked certain tax revenue to be used to
support the clergy of the Church of England.211
England generally moved towards a system allowing greater
testamentary freedom.212 Fraud, however, soon posed a serious threat to
that freedom. Prior to enactment of the Statute of Frauds of 1677,
testaments conveying real property only needed to be written;213 they did
not require the signature of the testator or witness.214 Testaments
conveying only personal property could be oral.215 In 1666, when the
Fire of London destroyed real estate records and the plague caused an
inordinate number of deaths, this legislative scheme proved disastrous.216
Real estate fraud was rampant.217 Without the signature of the testator or
disinterested witnesses, it was virtually impossible to determine whether
a purported testament was the actual will of the testator.218 The Statute
of Frauds of 1677 largely remedied this problem.219 Under the new law,
testaments conveying real property had to be in writing, signed by the
testator, and attested to before several disinterested witnesses.220
Testaments conveying only personal property were subject to a less
onerous form, but generally required a written instrument.221
While charitable giving and testamentary freedom gained popular
and legal support, family protection measures lost some ground.222 By
the 1700s, England had abandoned the laws and customs reserving a
209. See Mary F. Radford, The Case Against the Georgia Mortmain Statute, 8 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 313, 321 (1992).
210. See Oosterhoff, supra note 178, at 275.
211. See id.; Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the
Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2147 (2002).
212. See McMurray, supra note 187, at 110; Dainow, supra note 189, at 342.
213. James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L.
REV. 541, 547-48 (1990).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 550-52 (1990).
217. Id.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See McMurray, supra note 187, at 110; Dainow, supra note 189, at 342.
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portion of the testator’s property for his wife and children.223 It is not
entirely clear why England abolished these family protection
mechanisms.224 Certainly, women and children remained dependent on
their husbands and fathers for support and protection. The major
continental legal systems all retained some portion of a testator’s estate
for his wife and children—making the English abandonment of that
approach even more unusual.225
The popularity of the church and clergy eventually waned again and
England decided to recalibrate the competing public policies.226 Just a
few years after its enactment, “Queen Anne’s Bounty” was harshly
criticized as upsetting the recently restored balance of power between the
church and the state.227 In the absence of any limiting statute or custom,
people grew concerned that testators would make improvident charitable
bequests from their deathbeds to the church.228 Amid this renewed anticlergy sentiment, the English Parliament enacted the so-called Modern
Law of Mortmain in 1736 (the “Mortmain Act”).229 The Mortmain Act
took a different approach from the earlier mortmain statutes by explicitly
prohibiting testamentary bequests of land to charities, as well as
nullifying inter vivos transfers of land to charities when made within
twelve months of the donor’s death.230 Any nullified or prohibited
transfer simply reverted to the donor’s heirs.231 The motivations behind
the Mortmain Act are somewhat unclear. Some legislative history
suggests that the Mortmain Act was aimed at preventing property from
being removed from commerce.232 The express language of the
Mortmain Act explained that its purpose was to prevent testators from
making improvident death bed transfers of property to charities to the
detriment of their own families.233 However, “[i]t is probable that the
anti-clerical feeling was the most important, though unstated, reason for

223. McMurray, supra note 187, at 110.
224. See Dainow, supra note 189, at 342-44.
225. See McMurray, supra note 187, at 110-11.
226. See Oosterhoff, supra note 178 at 280; Sherman, supra note 22, at 595.
227. Bristowe, supra note 181, at 268.
228. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at 273; Sherman, supra note 22,
at 595; Bristowe, supra note 181, at 268.
229. Sherman, supra note 22, at 595; Bristowe, supra note 181, at 268.
230. See Sherman, supra note 22, at 597.
231. See id.
232. See Oosterhoff, supra note 179, at 278; Bristowe, supra note 181 at 268
233. Oosterhoff, supra note 178, at 281.
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the act.”234 In any event, English law sought to find the appropriate
balance between freedom of testation, family protection, and charitable
bequests.
Similar experiences with the church unfolded elsewhere in Western
Europe.235 Over time however, most countries, including England,
repealed their mortmain statutes.236 In England, repeal occurred first in a
piecemeal fashion in the early 1900s.237 By the 1950s, when England reexamined its mortmain statutes in a more comprehensive manner, the
mortmain laws had so many exceptions that they mainly served to
complicate law.238 In Parliament’s view, mortmain statutes were no
longer needed or well suited for protecting testamentary freedom and
family protection. Rather, by this era “the influence of the clergy had
been greatly undermined” and other existing laws could protect against
overreaching by the church.239
C. Mortmain in the United States
Early American jurisdictions greatly valued testamentary freedom
as the fundamental principle of wills.240 This policy continues today. In
recent years, American courts have described the freedom of testation as
a “fundamental concept”241 and a “specifically expressed constitutional
property right.”242 The American colonies did not, however, import the
English mortmain statutes. “[T]he English mortmain statutes were never
thought to be in force in this country unless they had been legislatively
adopted.”243 Many American jurisdictions did enact their own mortmain
statutes. A few states apparently shared the traditional concern that
excessive property ownership by religious organizations took property
234. Id. at 280.
235. Id. at 271.
236. Id. at 271-72, 291-92.
237. See id. at 291.
238. Id. at 293.
239. Oosterhoff, supra note 178, at 295.
240. See Jeffery M. Alden, Testamentary Capacity in a Nutshell: A Psychiatric
Reevaluation, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1119, 1120 (1966); Elizabeth R. Carter, New Life for the
Death Tax Debate, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 175, 194-98 (2012); Joshua C. Tate, Caregiving
and the Case for Testamentary Freedom, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 129, 149-50 (2008)..
241. Breeden v. Stone, 992 P.2d 1167, 1170 (2000).
242. Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 68. (Fla.
1990).
243. Osnes v. Morris, 298 S.E.2d 803, 810 (W. Va. 1982); accord Perin v. Carey,
65 U.S. 465 (1860).
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out of commerce. These states enacted laws restricting the amount of
property that a religious group or charity could own.244 The more
common concern, however, was protecting testators and their families
from overreaching by religious groups.245 To that end, some statutes
sought to balance the competing interests of family protection and
freedom of testation. As Justice Story explained, the purpose of these
statutes was:
to prevent undue influence and imposition upon pious
and feeble minds in their last moments, and to check an
unfortunate propensity (which is sometimes found to
exist under a bigoted fanaticism), the desire to acquire
fame as a religious devotee and benefactor at the
expense of all the natural claims of blood, and parental
duty.246
The American statutes took a variety of approaches. One approach
simply invalidated all testamentary bequests to charity if made within a
certain period before death.247 Others placed a limit on the amount of
property a testator could leave to a charity in his will, particularly if he
was survived by a wife or children.248 Some states used a combination of
the two approaches.249 The mortmain statutes eventually proved
unworkable. Percentage limitation mortmain statutes posed valuation
problems, particularly when the testator owned property in more than
one state.250 Some statutes were easily circumvented through careful

244. Kristine S. Knaplund, Charity for the “Death Tax”: The Impact of Legislation
on Charitable Bequests, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 713, 722-23 (2009). These states included
Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri, Virginia, Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania, and Oklahoma.
245. See, e.g., In re Estate of French, 365 A.2d 621, 622 (D.C. 1976) (“Mortmain
statutes in general are intended to protect a donor’s family from disinheritance due to
charitable gifts made either without proper deliberation or as a result of undue influence
on the part of the beneficiaries.”); In re Estate of Kinyon, 615 P.2d 174, 175 (Mont.
1980) (“[T]he purpose was two-fold, namely to prevent overreaching by charities and to
protect the interests of relatives.”).
246. Stephenson v. Short, 92 N.Y. 433, 444 (1883) (citing another source).
247. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§9.7 cmt. b (2003).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See Sherman, supra note 22, at 605-08. See generally G. Stanley Joslin,
Conflicts of Laws Problems Raised by “Modern Mortmain Acts,” 60 DICK. L. REV. 7
(1955).
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drafting.251 Moreover, Americans did not necessarily object to all
testamentary bequests to charity.252 Indeed, testamentary freedom
remained a valued principle, as did charitable giving.253 Americans were
concerned, however, that dependent family members be protected from
disinheritance and that testators be protected from overreaching or undue
influence on the part of charities.254 The problem with the mortmain
statutes was that, while aimed at both of these concerns, they were both
over and under-inclusive. The statutes were over-inclusive because they
voided “many intentional bequests by testators who were not
impermissibly influenced or who [did] not have immediate family
members in need of protection.”255 The statutes were also underinclusive because they did not “affect many charitable gifts made without
proper deliberation,” nor did they “void legacies to persons who are in an
equal position with religious persons to influence a testator.”256 In
response to mounting dissatisfaction with mortmain statutes, some states
repealed their statutes voluntarily. In other states, courts held the statutes
unconstitutional on a number of grounds, including the equal
protection257 and due process clauses of state and federal constitutions258
and state constitutional property guarantees.259 A few lower courts held
mortmain statutes unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds,260 but
higher courts generally declined to address that issue.261 By 1975
mortmain statutes remained in only eleven states.262 In 1998 the last
remaining mortmain statute—Georgia’s—was repealed.263
The mortmain statutes “were repealed because they were

251. See Sherman, supra note 22, at 605-08.
252. See Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 69-70.
(Fla. 1990).
253. Id.; see also Carter, supra note 240 at 180, 194-98.
254. See Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 69.
255. Id at 70 (quoting another source).
256. Id. (quoting another source).
257. See Shriners’ Hospital for Crippled Children v. Hester, 492 N.E.2d 153, 157
(Ohio 1986); Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 69.
258. See Sherman, supra note 22, at 609.
259. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 69.
260. See Cunningham, supra note 182, at 75-76.
261. See, e.g., Hester, 492 N.E.2d at 157 (“Based upon this holding we decline to
address Shriners’ challenge . . . under the Free Exercise Clauses of the Ohio and United
States Constitutions.”).
262. Cunningham, supra note 182, at 51; Sherman, supra note 22, at 582.
263. See Sherman, supra note 22, at 582; 2 DANIEL F. HINKEL, GEORGIA REAL
ESTATE LAW & PROCEDURE §16-33.1 ( 6th ed.).
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unworkable, not because they were unnecessary.”264 Yet the mortmain
statutes were not replaced with any particular legislation better tailored to
address the problem. Rather, it seems states were confident that the
existing law of undue influence provided adequate safeguards.265 The
doctrine of undue influence had emerged in both England and the United
States by the early 1800s.266 Initially, the doctrine was rather narrow and
required proof of coercion or fraud.267 Over time, courts liberalized the
doctrine and expanded its scope.268 By the time states began to abandon
their mortmain laws, the law of undue influence was firmly established
and increasingly robust. Many states assumed that the law of undue
influence could sufficiently protect testators and their families. That has
not been the case.
IV. The Non-Profit Sector Today
“Americans have long been, and continue to be, a famously
charitable people.”269 Charity plays an important—but complicated—
role in this country. Beginning in the colonial period, charities provided
important services that the government was unable or unwilling to
provide.270 The charitable sector today is a mix of secular and religious
organizations. When considered as a whole, however, the sector does
bear some resemblance in terms of size, power, and benefits to the
church of the past.
A. Size and Scope of the Non-Profit Sector

264. Sherman, supra note 22, at 582.
265. Id.
266. WILL CONTESTS, supra note 16, at § 2:8.
267. See Carla Spivack, Why the Testamentary Doctrine of Undue Influence Should
be Abolished, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 245, 262 (2010).
268. Id.
269. Rob Reich & Christopher Wimer, Charitable Giving and the Great Recession,
STAN. CENTER ON POVERTY AND INEQUALITY (Oct. 2012), available at
https://www.stanford.edu/group/recessiontrends/cgibin/web/sites/all/themes/barron/pdf/C
haritableGiving_fact_sheet.pdf.
270. See Barbara Bucholtz, Reflections on the Role of Nonprofit Associations in a
Representative Democracy, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 555, 558 (1998); Oliver A.
Houck, With Charity for All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1422-23 (1984); Irving G. Wyllie, The
Search for an American Law of Charity, 1776-1844, 46 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 203,
204-05 (1959).
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The vast majority of Americans—anywhere from sixty-four271 to
ninety-five percent272—donate money to charity each year. Since at least
1956, total charitable giving in the United States has been equal to about
two percent of total GDP,273 which is significantly higher than giving in
any other country.274 In 2011, private charitable giving totaled an
estimated $298.42 billion in the United States, which was actually a
slight decrease from prior years.275
In 2010, there were an estimated 2.3 million nonprofit organizations
operating in the United States.276 These organizations include religious
organizations, hospitals, educational organizations, colleges and
universities, and organizations promoting arts, culture and humanities.277
In 2010, these organizations collectively accounted for 9.2% of all wages
and salaries paid in the U.S.278 Among those organizations required to
file a financial return with the IRS, nonprofits reported $2.06 trillion in
revenues and $4.49 trillion in assets for the 2010 tax year.279 In 2012, the
nonprofit sector’s share of the national GDP was 5.5%.280
B. Legal and Economic Benefits Enjoyed by the Non-Profit Sector
Charities enjoy a remarkably privileged position in American law.
Legislation enacted at all levels of government confers considerable

271. CHARITIES AID FOUNDATION, WORLD GIVING INDEX 2011, 15 (2011), available
at
http://www.cafamerica.org/dnn/Portals/0/World%20Giving%20Index%202011/World%2
0Giving%20Index%20main%20report%20for%20download.pdf.
272. Eduardo Porter, Charity’s Role in America and its Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
14, 2012, at B1.
273. GIVING USA, THE ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 2011,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 21 (Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University 2012)
[hereinafter GIVING USA].
274. See CHARITABLE AID FOUNDATION, INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF
CHARITABLE
GIVING
2
(Nov.
2006),
available
at
https://www.cafonline.org/PDF/International%20Comparisons%20of%20Charitable%20
Giving.pdf.
275. Id.
276. Amy S. Blackwood et al., The Nonprofit Sector in Brief: Public Charities,
Giving, and Volunteering 2012, URBAN INSTITUTE (2010), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412674-The-Nonprofit-Sector-in-Brief.pdf.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Blackwood, supra note 276.
280. Quick Facts About Nonprofits, NATIONAL CENTER FOR CHARITABLE STATISTICS
(2012), available at http://nccs.urban.org/statistics/quickfacts.cfm.
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benefits on nonprofit organizations, benefits that often come at the
expense of taxpayers.281 Perhaps the best-known legal and economic
benefits afforded to charities are found in the tax arena. At the federal
level, qualifying nonprofit organizations are exempt from the income
tax.282 Donors to nonprofit organizations receive their own tax benefits,
including income tax deductions283 and gift and estate tax exemptions.284
Nonprofits with employees receive additional benefits. In addition to the
tax-deferred retirement and pension plans available to for-profit
organizations, nonprofit organizations have more options in the form of
403(b) plans and section 457 plans.285 Nonprofits are exempt from
federal unemployment payroll taxes and some religious organizations
may opt out of the social security system.286 Nonprofit organizations are
also exempt from various federal excise taxes and are entitled to reduced
postage rates.287 At the state level, religious and charitable organizations
receive additional benefits in the form of exemptions from property taxes
and sales and use taxes.288
Tax benefits, however, are not the only legal and economic benefits
afforded to nonprofit organizations by legislation. A number of antitrust
laws and regulations that apply to for-profit organizations do not apply to
nonprofits. “Schools, colleges, universities, public libraries, churches,
hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated for profit” are exempt
from the Robinson-Patman Act (prohibiting price discrimination) in
some instances.289 Most nonprofits are exempt from the Federal Trade
Commission Act, which prohibits “unfair methods of competition in
commerce, and unfair or deceptive practices in commerce.”290 Nonprofit
organizations are entitled to a few, but significant, exceptions from
federal securities laws and copyright laws.291 Nonprofit organizations
281. See, e.g., Michael A. Pagano, How Nonprofits Can End Up Becoming a Drain
on
City
Budgets,
ATLANTIC
(Nov.
12,
2012),
available
at
http://www.theatlanticcities.com/jobs-and-economy/2012/11/how-nonprofits-can-endbecoming-drain-city-budgets/3798/.
282. See 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2012); Bucholtz, supra note 270, at 560-61.
283. See 26 U.S.C.§ 170(c) (2012).
284. Id. §§ 2055, 2522.
285. Bazil Facchina et al., Privileges & Exemptions Enjoyed by Nonprofit
Organizations, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 85, 98-99 (1993).
286. Id. at 99-103.
287. Id. at 103, 112-14.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 105-06.
290. Id. at 106.
291. Id. at 107-11.
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cannot be placed in an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding.292 In the
labor and employment context, some nonprofit organizations are exempt
from the National Labor Relations Act and, in some instances, religious
organizations are exempt from anti-discrimination and civil rights
laws..293 Nonprofit organizations are exempt from a variety of criminal
laws including federal conflict of interest crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 207,
federal anti-bribery laws, and gambling related criminal law
Many of these federal benefits have state level
exemptions.294
equivalents.295
C. Policy Justifications for Legal and Economic Benefits Afforded to
Charities
Without question, nonprofits are favored as a matter of public
policy. A good deal of scholarship has considered this public policy in
the economic and tax policy context. Scholars point out that the
multitude of tax benefits conferred on nonprofit organizations and their
donors amounts to a subsidy or government expenditure for the benefit
of these organizations.296 Several popular explanations justify the
charitable subsidy. The traditional justification is that “subsidizing
charities is ‘good’ because of the benefits they provide.”297 Specifically,
“charities relieve the government of burdens it would otherwise have to
bear, such as poverty relief.”298 Charities “counter[] governmental power
and enhance[] pluralism,” “offer[] alternative viewpoints in arts and
culture” and “provide[] creative and diverse solutions to society’s
problems . . . .”299 A newer, and increasingly popular justification
contends that, “subsidizing charities is necessary to help them provide
good or services that would otherwise be under-produced due to various
market and governmental failures.”300 The nonprofit sector—and the
292. Id. at 112.
293. Id. at 116-17.
294. Id. at 117-29.
295. Id.
296. See, e.g., Miranda Perry Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity and the Charitable
Tax Subsidies, 91 B.U. L. REV. 601, 609-13 (2011) [hereinafter Fleischer, Equality of
Opportunity].
297. Miranda Perry Fleischer, Generous to a Fault? Fair Shares and Charitable
Giving, 93 MINN. L. REV. 165, 183 (2008) [hereinafter Fleischer, Generous to a Fault?].
298. Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity, supra note 296, at 610.
299. Fleischer, Generous to a Fault?, supra note 297, at 183.
300. Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity, supra note 296, at 611.
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subsidies it receives—has been both applauded and criticized in recent
years for a variety of reasons.301 Although these critiques are obviously
important, they fail to consider the wisdom of this public policy in the
context of the individual testator.
D. Non-Profits & Testamentary Bequests
Testamentary bequests play an important role in the financial plans
of non-profit organizations.302 Many nonprofit organizations are looking,
in part, to the Baby Boomer wealth transfer as an important source of
funding.303 In their view “[t]he downturn is not going to keep people
from dying, and it is not going to keep a wealth transfer from
occurring.”304 Bequest giving already accounts for an important source
of funding in the non-profit sector. It is estimated that testamentary
bequests account for about 8% of total annual charitable giving. 305 In
2011, that 8% amounted approximately $24.41 million.306
At 8%, testamentary bequests represent a small, yet significant,
portion of overall yearly giving. That figure is actually more impressive
than it might seem at first glance. Approximately 2.5 million people died
in the U.S. in 2011.307 Of those 2.5 million, approximately forty-six
percent died without significant financial assets rendering them unable to

301. See generally, Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L.
REV. 501 (1990); Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endowments and the Democratization of
Dynasty, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 873 (1997); Bucholtz, supra note 270, at 555.; Fleischer,
Equality of Opportunity, supra note 296, at 601; Fleischer, Generous to a Fault?, supra
note 298, at 165; Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of
America’s Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437 (2005); Lloyd Hitoshi
Mayer, The “Independent” Sector: Fee-for-Service Charity and the Limits of Autonomy,
65 VAND. L. REV. 51 (2012); Shannon Weeks McCormack, Taking the Good With the
Bad: Recognizing the Negative Externalities Created by Charities and Their Implications
for the Charitable Deduction, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 977 (2010).
302. See e.g. Bartholomew A. Seymour, III, How to Market Planned Giving to
Donors, 22 NONPROFIT WORLD, No. 6 at 7 (2004).
303. See Howard Husock, The Fiscal Cliff Deal: Charity Takes a Hit, FORBES, (Jan.
3, 2013), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/howardhusock/2013/01/03/the-fiscalcliff-deal-charity-takes-a-hit/.
304. Morais, supra note 8 (quoting another source).
305. GIVING USA, supra note 273, at 8.
306. Id.
307. Donna L. Hoyert & Jiaquan Xu, Deaths: Preliminary Data for 2011, 61 NAT’L
VITAL STAT. REP. No. 6, at 2 (Oct. 10, 2012) available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_06.pdf.
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leave a bequest to anyone.308 Presumably then, the $24.41 million in
charitable bequests came in the form of a small number of rather large
bequests to charity. Indeed, there is a significant gap between the
number of Americans who donate to charity during life and the number
of Americans who give money at death.309 Although most Americans
donate to charity during life, only eight percent of Americans name
charities in their estate plans.310 Interestingly, that eight percent figure is
comparable to findings in the United Kingdom311 and Australia.312 In the
view of charities and planned giving professionals, that eight percent
figure translates into a “giving channel” with “untapped potential” to
The nonprofit sector is expending
“yield additional gifts.”313
considerable resources studying donors in order to “add to the body of
knowledge about how fund raisers can enhance the number of bequests
given to charitable organizations.”314
1. How Charities Solicit Testamentary and Other Gifts: The Planned
Giving Campaign
The typical planned giving campaign involves three key steps.
First, the charity collects data on its existing inter vivos donors. Second,
the charity analyzes that data to identify the most likely charitable
bequest donors—or “prospects.”315
Third, the charity directs a

308. James M. Poterba et al., Were They Prepared for Retirement? Financial Status
at Advanced Ages in the HRS and Ahead Cohorts, 40 (NBER Working Papers NO. 17824,
2012).
309. See Emily Krauser, Demographics and Motivations of Potential and Actual
Donors, CENTER ON PHILANTHROPY IND. U., 14 (Mar. 2007) available at
http://www.campbellcompany.com/Portals/22807/docs/Bequest%20Donors%20Full%20
Report%20with%20Exec%20Summary.pdf.
310. Id.
311. John Micklewright et al., Charitable Bequests and Wealth at Death 13 (Inst.
For Study of Lab., Discussion Paper No. 7014, 2012) (estimating that “6 per cent of
deaths in Britain in 2007 resulted in a charitable bequest.”).
312. Diana Olsberg & Mark Winters, Ageing in Place: Intergenerational and
Intrafamilial Housing Transfers and Shifts in Later Life 76 (Austl. Hous. & Urb. Res.
Inst., Final Rep. No. 88, 2005) (Of the 96.2% of respondents reporting having made a
will, 7.1% reported making bequests to a charity, church or institution.).
313. See Krauser, supra note 309, at 11.
314. Id.
315. See Lawrence Henze, How The Right Marketing Strategies Can Enhance Your
Planned
Giving
Program,
BLACKBAUD
(Apr.
2011),
https://www.blackbaud.com/files/resources/downloads/WhitePaper_TargetAnalytics_Pla
nnedGiving.pdf (“If you have done the data mining, and you know the best individuals
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multifaceted marketing campaign at those donors. Each step in this
process is sophisticated, aggressive, backed in actual research, and
largely exempt from legal regulation.
a. Data Collection
The first step in any planned giving campaign is to identify potential
testamentary donors. Charities are able to collect, utilize, and share this
data on their current donors, clients, alumni, members, and potential
donors with little governmental regulation. The privacy laws and
regulations that protect consumer information in the for-profit context do
not usually apply to nonprofit organizations.316 Nonprofit fundraisers are
free to engage in practices—like telephone solicitations—that are
prohibited in the commercial context.317 Charities, particularly the large
ones, collect all sorts of information about their donors and potential
donors. Once an organization has some very basic information about a
person in their database—like a name and address—they can conduct
formal research—either in house or with the help of a research
company—to add to that information.
Suppose I decide to donate ten dollars to a charity using the link on
its website. In order to pay by credit card, the charity will require me to
provide my full name, billing address, and phone number.318 Many
nonprofits will require additional information such as an e-mail address.
Knowing only my name and address, a researcher can discover all sorts
of information about me, often for free. If the charity wanted to
determine whether I was a likely charitable bequest donor, then the
charity might want to know my age, marital status, number and ages of
children (if any), education, religious affiliation, income, and net
worth.319 The salaries of state and federal employees are often public
information. For other potential donors, income and net worth may be
approximated. Several pieces of data can indicate wealth: an expensive
home, other real estate holdings like vacation homes, a high paying
occupation, owning a luxury car, owning a boat, having an expensive
most likely to make charitable bequests . . . you may effectively target the annual reports
and newsletters.”).
316. See generally Ely R. Levy & Norman I. Silber, Nonprofit Fundraising and
Consumer Protection: A Donor’s Right to Privacy, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 519 (2004).
317. See id.
318. See, e.g., AMERICAN RED CROSS, www.redcross.org (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).
319. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
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hobby, frequent travel, and inherited wealth.320 Knowing just my name
and address, the charity can quickly uncover most of this information.
By visiting anybirthday.com the researcher can input my name, city, and
state and determine my age. The researcher can use my name and
address to search the local property records to see if I own my house, its
value, and if I have a mortgage. The property record might also reveal
my marital status. Knowing only my name and address, the researcher
can quickly discover whether I have made any political contributions
since 1980.321 If so, the researcher will also learn the dates, amounts, and
recipients of the contribution, as well as my occupation.322
Facebook, Twitter, Linked In, and other social media sites are a
goldmine of information.323 Depending on my privacy settings, the
researcher may be able to determine my marital status, sexual
orientation, race, whether I have children, their approximate ages, my
education, employer, hobbies, interests, recent illnesses, recent travel,
and a myriad of additional information. All of the information just
described can be obtained for free, online, with just a few minutes worth
of research. Already the researcher has obtained the data necessary to
see whether I meet a number of the demographic markers of a likely
charitable bequest donor.324 Of course, the researcher could do a little
more work and discover even more information about me relevant to
charitable bequests. For example, the researcher may be able to
determine my actual salary, my pattern of charitable giving to other
organizations, my social and professional affiliations, and my private
business holdings.
b.

Analyzing the Data

A growing body of research identifies the characteristics of living
donors who make charitable bequests and explains the factors that
motivate those bequests. Most lifetime donors do not leave money to
charity at death.325 One study found that 90.6% of donors who gave at
320. See The Donor Cultivation System 2, PUB. BROAD. MAJOR GIVING INITIATIVE,
http://majorgivingnow.org/downloads/pdf/cultivation_system.pdf.
321. See, e.g., POLITICAL MONEY LINE, http://www.politicalmoneyline.com (last
visited Mar. 10, 2014).
322. Id.
323. See Somini Sengupta, Staying Private on the New Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
7, 2013), at B1.
324. See POLITICAL MONEY LINE, supra note 321.
325. Russell N. James, III, Health, Wealth, and Charitable Estate Planning: A
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least $500 to a charity during life, did not leave any money to charity at
death.326 The decision to donate money during life apparently involves a
different decision-making process than the decision to leave money at
death. A recent functional MRI study revealed that deciding to leave a
charitable bequest involved a different brain region than the decision to
donate money or time during life.327 Researchers are working to identify
the differences in that decision making process in order to convert
lifetime donors into bequest donors. Studies consistently show that
family makeup is strongly related to whether a person will leave a
charitable bequest. Testators who are married or who have children or
grandchildren are generally less likely to make charitable bequests.328
However, parents appear more likely to leave charitable bequests when
their children have higher incomes of their own.329 Although it appears
that “no other indicator is a [sic] strong as childlessness,” other
demographic factors are important.330 The likelihood of making a
charitable bequest increases with education level, with graduate degree
holders being the most likely to leave a charitable bequest.331 Being
solicited by a charity for a bequest gift is positively associated with
making a bequest gift.332 Other characteristics positively associated with
making a charitable bequest include: volunteering for the charity,
attending religious services, higher socioeconomic status, income, and
previous cancer diagnosis.333
c. Marketing Campaign
Once the nonprofit identifies a pool of likely bequest donor
Longitudinal Examination of Testamentary Charitable Giving Plans, 38 NONPROFIT &
VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 1026, 1032 (2009).
326. Id.
327. Russell N. James, III & Michael W. O’Boyle, Charitable Estate Planning as
Visualized Autobiography: An fMRI Study of Its Neural Correlates, NONPROFIT &
VOLUNTARY
SECTOR
Q.
(Oct.
22,
2012),
http://nvs.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/10/17/0899764012463121.
328. See, e.g., James, supra note 325, at 1039 (“[T]he presence of children or
grandchildren . . . was the most dominant factor in predicted charitable testamentary
planning across all analyses.”).
329. Id. at 1027.
330. Id. at 1039.
331. See James, supra note 325, at 1031; Krauser, supra note 309, at 26.
332. Profile of a Bequest Giver, STELTER DONOR INSIGHT REP. 3-4 (2008),
http://www.stelter.com/research-whitepapers/DIR-ProfileBequest.pdf.
333. James, supra note 325, at 1030-34.
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prospects, it will deploy a multifaceted marketing campaign soliciting a
charitable bequest. Marketing can help create desires that previously did
not exist.334 The marketing campaign starts early; years before research
suggests the prospect is likely to actually make the gift.335 Marketing
campaigns often start with a variety of direct mailings, including post
cards, newsletters, annual reports, and magazines.336 The direct mail is
sent to a large group of potential donors with the knowledge that most of
them will not actually respond to the direct mail.337 Rather, the direct
mail campaign is intended to influence the prospects so that, “the ground
is softer for the next promotion.”338 Post cards have the benefit of being
inexpensive to produce and mail. They also have higher readership rates
than other forms of direct mail.339 Newsletters and magazines will
generally include some “compelling donor stories that tug at the
heartstrings of [the] audience . . . .”340
Research suggests that one barrier to charitable bequests is people
do not believe they are wealthy enough to make those gifts.341 To
overcome that barrier, newsletters and magazines will include
personalized stories about existing donors that are financially situated
similarly to the prospect.342 The goal of these personal accounts is to
“simply and effectively bring home the message to prospects through
sharing living examples of people ‘just like them’ who were able to make
personally-significant planned gifts.”343 The personal accounts have the
334. See Douglas A. Kysar, Kids & Cul-de-Sacs: Census 2000 and the
Reproduction of Consumer Culture, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 853, 889 (2002) (book review).
335. Seymour, supra note 302, at 7; Phyllis Freedman & Kathy Ward, Applying the
Art & Science of Direct Marketing to Planned Giving (2010), http://www.smartgiving.com/plannedgivingblogger/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Applying-the-ArtScience-of-Direct-Marketing-to-Planned-Giving.pdf; see Katherine Swank & Michael
Quevli,
Prospect
Research
for
Planned
Gifts,
BLACKBAUD
(2011),
https://www.blackbaud.com/files/resources/downloads/WhitePaper_ProspectResearchfor
PlannedGifts.pdf.
336. See Henze, supra note 315.; Viken Mikaelian, Planned Giving Marketing
Secrets Revealed, VIRTUAL GIVING (2013), http://plannedgiving.com/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2007/05/pgsecrets.pdf.
337. See Gary Pforzheimer, Planned Giving Marketing: Benchmarking and
Beyond, PG CALC. INC., 13 (2008), http://www.pgcalc.com/pdf/Outline1150.pdf.
338. Id.
339. See, e.g., Mikaelian, supra note 336.
340. Pforzheimer, supra note 337, at 13.
341. See Henze, supra note 315, at 4.
342. Id. at 4.
343. Id. at 4; see also Pforzheimer, supra note 337, at 9-10. For examples of these
stories, see, e.g., Paul C. Lauterbur, Honoring Nobel Laureate Paul Lauterbur, 14 SIGMA
XI TODAY 1, 95 (2005).
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added benefit of convincing prospects that bequest giving is a social
norm and is expected of them.344 “Studies show that people help more
when they are exposed to role models who help, presumably because the
model provides information about the social norms for and the
consequences of helping.”345 The marketing campaign will also include
events, e-mail, and a website.346 Once the ground is thoroughly
“softened” the nonprofit will follow up with phone calls and personal
visits.347 During the first visit the nonprofit’s representative will simply
thank a prospect for a recent annual gift and try to find out more
information about the prospect.348 The representative will then follow up
with the prospect with meetings and phone calls and will eventually
begin to broach the issue of a bequest gift.349
Another perceived barrier to charitable bequests is convincing
current inter vivos donors to execute a will. A number of polls and
studies estimate that anywhere from fifty to sixty-five percent of
Americans do not have a will.350 Many people delay writing wills
because of the cost351 and discomfort discussing death.352 Savvy
nonprofits overcome this barrier by offering free estate planning

344. See Neeli Bendapudi et al., Enhancing Helping Behavior: An Integrative
Framework for Promotion Planning, 69 AM. J. MARKETING 33, 43 (1996).
345. Id. (citations omitted).
346. Pforzheimer, supra note 337, at 13-14.
347. Id. at 18.
348. LAWRENCE HENZE & KATHERINE SWANK, CREATING A LEGACY: BUILDING A
PLANNED GIVING PROGRAM FROM THE GROUND UP 40-43 (2008).
349. Id.
350. See, e.g., Ashlea Ebeling, Americans Lack Basic Estate Plans, FORBES, March
1, 2010, available at http://www.forbes.com/2010/03/01/estate-tax-living-will-schiavopersonal-finance-no-estate-plans.html?boxes=Homepagechannels (finding only 35% of
survey respondents had a will); Jenny Greenhough, 57% of Adults Don’t Have a Will—
Are You One of Them?, ROCKET LAWYER, March 31, 2011, available at
http://blog.rocketlawyer.com/2011-wills-estate-planning-survey-95235; Gary Langer,
Poll: Americans Not Planning for the Future, ABC NEWS, AUG. 26, 2012, available at
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=86992&page=1#.UVNwHaWRjzI
(finding
fewer than 50% of respondents had a will).
351. See Christine Dugas, Times Change Wills, Yet Many Americans Don’t Have
One,
USA
TODAY,
Apr.
30,
2012,
available
at
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/perfi/basics/story/2012-04-27/preparing-awill/54632436/1; Carole Fleck, Many Boomers Don’t Have Wills, Poll Finds, AARP
BLOG, May 1, 2012, available at http://blog.aarp.org/2012/05/01/many-boomers-donthave-wills-poll-finds/.
352. See Adrian Sargeant & Jen Shang, Identification, Death and Bequest Giving,
REP. ON FUNDRAISING AND PHILANTHROPY 5-6 (Sept. 2008).
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seminars and estate planning services to their donors and volunteers.353
Consumer research suggests that we are highly motivated when offered
something for free.354 Moreover, nonprofits seek to offer these services
at key milestones when potential donors are most likely to write or rewrite a will: “births, marriages, retirements, [and] family members’
deaths.”355
V. Inadequate Restraints on Charitable Giving and Possible
Solutions
The existing rules aimed at ensuring testamentary freedom and
family protection are poorly suited for protecting testators and their
families from the overreaching of charities. The few laws and reported
decisions touching on the issue demonstrate a fundamental
misunderstanding of how nonprofits today solicit testamentary bequests.
They also illustrate how this misunderstanding has not only led to an
imbalance, but also, to the potential exploitation of testators and their
families by the nonprofit sector. The problem is evident in several
contexts.
A. Interested Parties
The rule prohibiting an interested party from serving as a witness to
a will or participating in its drafting serves an important function. By
prohibiting bequests to witnesses, the rule seeks to “preserve the integrity
of the process of will executions by removing the possibility that
attesting witnesses who receive a disposition under the will might give
false testimony in support of the will to protect their legacies.”356 The
requirement seeks “to prevent fraud or undue influence by a witness to a
353. See, e.g., Estate Planning Seminar Offered in Norman, THE JOURNAL RECORD,
May 20, 2008; Joyce Gannon, Planned Giving Gets New Life: For Some, Recession
Changes Approach to Charitable Donations, PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 24, 2009;
Homecoming Activities Begin at WVSU, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Oct. 3, 2013; Love,
supra note 8, at A20.
354. See, e.g., Something Doesn’t Add Up, THE ECONOMIST, June 30, 2012,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/21557801; Farnoosh Torabi, Pricing
Psychology: 7 Sneaky Retail Tricks, CBS NEWS, April 29, 2011, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505144_162-41541822/pricing-psychology-7-sneakyretail-tricks/.
355. Love, supra note 8, at A20.
356. In re Estate of Morea, 645 N.Y.S.2d 1022, 1022-23 (Sur. Ct. 1996).
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will to thwart the intention of the [testator].”357 For thousands of years
this rule has sought to maintain the integrity of the testamentary process.
In an effort to procure more property for itself, the church successfully
eroded this requirement during the Middle Ages.358 Abuse was rampant
and the public lost confidence in the church and the sanctity of the
testamentary process. Over time, the law again prohibited interested
parties from serving as witnesses to wills or participating in their
drafting. In recent years, however, the strength of this rule has again
waned. “[T]he Uniform Probate Code [UPC] scrapped the requirement
that witnesses be disinterested in the will.”359 According to the UPC’s
official comment, “[t]he requirement of disinterested witnesses has not
succeeded in preventing fraud and undue influence; and in most cases of
undue influence, the influencer is careful not to sign as a witness, but to
procure disinterested witnesses.”360 The comment further explains that,
“attorneys will continue to use disinterested witnesses in the execution of
wills.”361 This view, which a number of respected scholars share, is
misplaced. When interested parties are intimately involved in the
testamentary process, it casts a cloud over the legitimacy of the entire
process and undermines public confidences. The ability of an heir to
bring an undue influence claim does absolutely nothing to remedy that
harm. If anything, increased litigation over testaments exacerbates that
harm. Undue influence claims are notoriously difficult to prove—
particularly where the primary witnesses to the testamentary process
have an incentive to give self-serving testimony. Undue influence cases
are expensive and can rip a family apart in the process. The UPC’s faith
that attorneys will exercise good judgment in selecting witnesses is sadly
misplaced.362 Moreover, the UPC seems to presuppose that the
influencer has a malicious intent to defraud the testator and will take
steps to cover his tracks. That is not necessarily true—particularly in the
357. In re Estate of Johnson, 347 So. 2d 785, 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); accord
In re Estate of Small, 346 F. Supp. 600, 600-01 (D.D.C. 1972) (“The evident purpose was
to give maximum effect to wills and at the same time to eliminate any financial incentive
which might taint the necessary objectivity of the attesting witness.”).
358. See supra Part III.
359. Lindgren, supra note 213, at 561.
360. Unif. Probate Code § 2-505 cmt (1969).
361. Id.
362. See, e.g., Small, 346 F. Supp. at 601; Herman v. Kogan, 487 So. 2d 48, 48
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); In re Estate of Meskimen, 235 N.E.2d 619, 624 (Ill. 1968);
Berndtson v. Heuberger, 173 N.E.2d 460, 461 (Ill. 1961); In re Estate of Schroeder, 441
N.W.2d 527, 533 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Burke v. Kehr, 876 S.W.2d 718, 720 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1994); In re Estate of Carano, 868 P. 2d 699, 702 (Okla. 1994).
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case of charitable bequests.363 When the representative of a charity
improperly procures a bequest for a charity, does that necessarily make
him a bad actor? More likely, he is either doing his job as part of the
organization’s fundraising team or he is genuinely interested in the
success of the charity. Undoubtedly, many, if not most, members of the
clergy in the MiddleAges were similarly motivated and they did not
attempt to conceal their involvement in the testamentary process. Their
intimate involvement in the testamentary process, however, harmed
testators, testators’ families, and the church and undermined public
confidence in the entire process.
Today, the scope of the problem varies by jurisdiction. A number
of states continue to require disinterested witnesses and scriveners.
Courts, however, often decline to apply those laws in the context of
charitable bequest.
1. Refusal of Courts to Apply the Existing Disinterested Witness
Rule to Charities
A number of jurisdictions continue to expressly prohibit an
interested party from serving as a witness. These jurisdictions, by
statute, impose a variety of penalties—the thrust of which is to typically
deny a bequest made to a witness. In practice, courts tend to interpret the
statutes as requiring a direct pecuniary benefit to the witness.364 Relying
on the direct pecuniary interest requirement, some courts have refused to
apply these statutes in the charitable bequest context. Courts essentially
draw a dividing line between the charitable organization itself and its
members and representatives reasoning that a witness’ membership in
the charitable organization does not void a bequest to that charity
“because the member’s interest is too indirect to be a disqualifying
interest . . . .”365 In some cases, this approach makes sense. For
example, In re Will of Potter involved a charitable bequest to the town of
363. It appears that courts also share this unfounded view. See, e.g., In re Estate of
Hamm, 262 N.W.2d 201, 206-07 (S.D. 1979) (“[I]f Baldwin were the blackguard that the
contestants paint him he would have deleted all reference to the Home and assured
himself of the trusteeship with all of the increments and fees attended thereto.”).
364. See, e.g., In re Estate of Wolfner, 188 N.E.2d 712, 714 (Ill. 1963) (“The
interest which disqualifies a witness must be such an interest in the will that a pecuniary
gain or loss will come to him directly as the immediate result of is provisions.”);
Triestman v. Kilgore, 838 S.W.2d 547, 547 (Tex. 1992) (“A competent witness to a will
is one who receives no pecuniary benefit under its terms.”).
365. In re Estate of Tkachuk, 139 Cal. Rptr. 55, 58 (Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
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Pawlet for upkeep of roads and bridges.366 All three witnesses to the will
were residents of the town and taxpayers, and, therefore, would all
benefit from the charitable bequest.367 If the court had strictly applied
the disinterested witness requirement, then, presumably, no one in the
town could serve as a witness—an obviously absurd result. Rather, the
court reasoned that “[n]o one of the witnesses to this will had a fixed,
certain, and vested pecuniary interest in the will, and so no one of them
was incompetent because of that interest.”368
Courts consistently refuse to apply the applicable statute even where
the witnesses’ interest in the charitable bequest is more direct and the
witnesses have an obvious interest in the outcome of the will. Estate of
Tkachuk illustrates this point.369 In that case the decedent wrote a will
leaving the bulk of his property to the church.370 At the decedent’s
request, Reverend Myczka typed the decedent’s will, accompanied the
decedent to a notary’s office, and signed as a witness to the will. 371
Reverend Myczka was employed by the church and served as an officer,
treasurer, and member of the executive committee.372 The decedent’s
brother later challenged the bequest to the church under an existing
statute that invalidated bequests to subscribing witnesses.373 The court
conceded that the Reverend Myczka was not an entirely disinterested
witness in light of his position as an officer of the church.374 However,
the court upheld the bequest to the church reasoning that the language of
the statute “does not void gifts to a beneficiary where one of the
subscribing witnesses, who is not a beneficiary, is interested in the
bequest.”375 The court construed the language of the applicable statute
narrowly and reasoned that the bequest in question was to the church, not
Reverend Myczka.376
Some courts go further and uphold the testament even when the

366. In re Will of Potter, 95 A. 646, 647 (Vt. 1915).
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. In re Estate of Tkachuk, 139 Cal. Rptr. 55 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); accord In re
Estate of Jordan, 519 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975); In re Estate of Giacomini, 603
P.2d 218 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979).
370. In re Estate of Tkachuk, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 56-57.
374. Id. at 56.
375. Id. at 56-57.
376. Id. at 57.
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witness does receive a direct pecuniary benefit. In these cases, the courts
reason that the pecuniary benefit involved is not the type of benefit
envisioned by the statute.
Estate of Giacomini illustrates this
approach.377 Robert Davis, an attorney prepared the decedent’s will,
which left the bulk of her estate to several charitable beneficiaries.378
Mr. Davis, who was also a subscribing witness to the will, stood to
receive a number of pecuniary benefits.379 The will named Mr. Davis as
executor, without bond, and gave him the power to employ his own law
firm and to pay the firm without prior court approval.380 Further, Mr.
Davis held positions with two of the charitable beneficiaries—serving as
a member of the board of trustees of one organization, and on the fundraising advisory council of the other.381 Yet, the court held that Mr.
Davis did not stand to benefit from the will and could therefore serve as a
witness without any consequences.382 In reaching its conclusion, the
court reasoned that his appointment as executor was not the type of
pecuniary interest that would disqualify him as a witness because it only
entitled him to be compensated for labor he would perform in a fiduciary
capacity.383
Courts should construe these statutes more broadly and jurisdictions
that have adopted the UPC approach should reconsider. In a case like
that of Reverend Myczka, the court should not draw a distinction
between the charity’s representative and the charity itself. Because a
charity can only act through its representatives, that distinction is
nonsensical. When a charity’s representative is intimately involved in
the drafting and execution of a testament, it casts doubt on the integrity
of the entire process. Voiding bequests under such circumstances serves
as a meaningful deterrent and can help avoid the harm associated with
subsequent undue influence litigation. The direct pecuniary interest
requirement, as illustrated in Giacomini, should likewise be interpreted
more broadly. The fact that Mr. Davis was an attorney and that his
sizeable pecuniary interest in the estate and its administration required
him to perform services does not remove the taint of the impropriety of
his actions. Indeed, those very facts tend to undermine public confidence
377. In re Estate of Giacomini, 603 P.2d 218 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979); accord LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. arts. 1581-83 (2013).
378. In re Estate of Giacomini, 603 P.2d at 219.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. See id.
383. See id., at 220.
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in the legal profession as a whole.384
2. Rules Requiring Disinterested Scrivener Inapplicable
Most jurisdictions have no affirmative law prohibiting a party who
prepares a will from benefitting under its terms. The UPC is silent on the
issue and many jurisdictions simply consider a benefit received by the
drafter as a factor in an undue influence analysis. This presents the exact
same set of problems as allowing interested witnesses. The few states
that do address the issue by statute fail to adequately address interested
scriveners in the charitable context. For example, Kansas invalidates any
“provision in a will, written or prepared for another person, that gives the
writer or preparer or the writer’s or preparer’s parent, children, issue,
sibling, or spouse any devise or bequest . . . .”385 The statute is simply
inapplicable in the charitable context. California goes somewhat further
and imposes a presumption of fraud or undue influence with respect to
bequests to the party who drafted the will or otherwise has a fiduciary or
business relationship with the testator.386 Although the scope of the
California prohibition is broad, nonprofit organizations are specifically
excluded.387 In enacting the statutory exception benefiting non-profits,
the legislature acknowledged the need to protect testators from the undue
influence of fiduciaries.388 The legislature decided to exempt nonprofit
organizations from the scope of the prohibition in order to encourage
charitable bequests and “ensure that particular recipients of transfers are
not disqualified as beneficiaries simply because they drafted the
language of the transferring instrument.”389 This approach ignores the
well-documented history of overreaching by the church in drafting
testamentary instruments.
In most jurisdictions, the only rule discouraging scriveners from
preparing testaments in their own favor are the ethical rules governing
the legal profession. While these professional responsibility rules are
384. See, e.g., Gerald P. Johnston, An Ethical Analysis of Common Estate Planning
Practices—Is Good Business Bad Ethics?, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 57, 83-88 (1984).
385. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-605 (2013).
386. CAL. PROB. CODE §21380 (2014).
387. CAL. PROB. CODE §21382 (2014).
388. Laura J. Fowler, Administration of Estates; Prohibition of Transfers of
Property—Exception, 26 PAC. L. J. 272, 275 (1994) (this article refers to CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 21350, which has since been repealed and replaced with new lesgilation, CAL. PROB.
CODE §§ 21380, 21382) .
389. Id.
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well founded, they are wholly insufficient. Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.8(c) prevents a lawyer from soliciting a bequest for himself or
his family and from preparing an instrument where he receives a
bequest.390 Every jurisdiction has some comparable prohibition. Rule
1.8 is aimed, at(among other things) protecting testators from undue
influence.391 The rule does not adequately protect testators from
overreaching.392 In many jurisdictions, the rules of professional conduct
do not have the force of law.393 In those jurisdictions, a violation of Rule
1.8 will not render a testamentary bequest invalid and may not result in
significant disciplinary action against the attorney.394 Even if a violation
of Rule 1.8 does not invalidate a bequest, most jurisdictions would
consider the violation as evidence supporting an undue influence
claim.395 However, courts resist that approach in the charitable context
and will apply the pecuniary interest analysis to determine that the
attorney did not benefit from the charitable bequest.396 Moreover, the
rules of professional responsibility do not apply to non-lawyers. In a
case like Tkachuk where the party drafting the will is not a lawyer, the
drafting party is not bound by the rules of professional responsibility and
cannot be punished for their violation. With the availability of will
drafting software, virtually anyone can draft a valid testament without
the assistance of an attorney.397
B. Refusal of Courts to Apply Undue Influence in the Charitable Context
Undue influence could provide a meaningful remedy from
overreaching by charities and their representatives if courts were willing
390. See MODEL R. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (1983)..
391. Id.
392. See Johnston, supra note 384, at 83-84.
393. Louisiana appears to be an exception to this view. See Succession of Parham,
755 So. 2d 265, 270 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (“The Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct .
. . have the force and effect of substantive law.”).
394. See Sandford v. Probate Appeal, Nos. CV-05-4005186-S, CV-05-4005187-S,
2008 WL 544439 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2008); In re Will of Cromwell, 552 N.Y.S.2d
480, 482 (Sur. Ct. 1989); In re Estate of Pedrick, 482 A.2d 215, 218 (Pa. 1984); In re
Bloch, 625 A.2d 57, 58 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
395. See Kirschbaum v. Dillon, 567 N.E.2d 1291, 1302 (Ohio 1991).
396. See Knowlton v. Schultz, 902 N.E.2d 548 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).
397. See, e.g., In re Estate of Brevard, 213 S.W.3d 298 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006)
(pastor used computer software to prepare testament benefitting himself). See generally
Wendy S. Geoffe & Rochelle L. Haller, From Zoom to Doom? Risks of Do-It-Yourself
Estate Planning, ESTATE PLANNING (Apr. 2011).
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to apply the law in the charitable context. Yet, courts consistently refuse
to afford facts indicating undue influence appropriate evidentiary weight
when a charity and its representatives are involved. The problem is
evident at nearly every stage of the undue influence analysis.
1. Confidential Relationship
The existence of a confidential relationship is a threshold issue in
most undue influence cases. Courts have repeatedly found reliant-type
confidential relationships where one person relies on another to select an
A nonprofit whose
attorney and provide financial guidance.398
representatives provide estate planning and similar financial services to
donors should be held to that same standard.
In furthering their planned giving campaigns, nonprofits routinely
solicit their prospects to execute wills.399 A popular solicitation
technique involves explaining the tax and economic benefits available to
charitable bequest donors.400
Indeed, “the deductibility
ofcharitablebequests enhances the attractiveness of leaving a portion of
one’sestatetocharity.”401 Many planned giving officers themselves hold
advanced degrees in law and accounting. When the nonprofits are
successful it is hardly surprising that the prospect may ask the
nonprofit’s representative to suggest what attorney he should visit. The
representative will gladly do so, taking advantage of the special trust and
confidence the donor has bestowed upon it, and will even foot the bill for
the expense.
Some nonprofits address attorney recommendation
situations proactively by retaining attorneys ahead of time so that they
may offer estate-planning services to their prospects free of charge. The
relationship bears all the hallmarks of a confidential relationship, yet
courts are hesitant to find a confidential relationship in a charitable
bequest setting. In the view of some courts, “it is not improper for
charitable organizations to offer estate planning advice, including plans
for charitable donations.”402
I disagree. History amply illustrates the impropriety of the
representatives of a charitable organization taking over the testamentary
398.
399.
400.
401.

See Harris v. Jourdan, 180 P.3d 119, 132 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.
B. Douglas Bernheim. Does the Estate Tax Raise Revenue?, 1 TAX POLICY &
ECONOMY, 113, 116 (1987), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10931.pdf.
402. Estate of Davis v. Cook, 9 S.W.3d 288, 293-94 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).
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process. When the representative of a charitable organization
successfully solicits a testator to write a will naming the organization as a
beneficiary, helps the testator select an attorney, and foots the bill for the
services a confidential relationship exists and the courts should recognize
this simple and obvious fact. The refusal or courts to find a confidential
relationship in the charitable context is especially troubling because the
existence of a confidential relationship is a threshold issue in many
jurisdictions. Even in those jurisdictions that do not expressly require a
finding of a confidential relationship, the existence of a confidential
relationship strongly supports a finding of the other required elements of
an undue influence claim.
In Campbell, the testator, Mrs. Campbell, developed a close
friendship with Mr. Upchurch, a university’s planning giving officer.403
Mrs. Campbell sought Mr. Upchurch’s advice on arranging her longterm financial and physical care. After moving to property adjacent to
the university, Mrs. Campbell asked Mr. Upchurch to recommend an
attorney to help prepare her estate planning documents and to make an
appointment for her. Mr. Upchurch not only located an attorney—the
university’s general counsel—he attended the meetings with Ms.
Campbell and corresponded with the attorney regarding Mrs. Campbell’s
plans. Mr. Upchurch even arranged for the university to pay the
attorney’s bill. Mrs. Campbell obviously had a relationship of trust and
confidence with Mr. Upchurch. However, the court was unwilling to
rule that Mr. Upchurch and, in turn, the university, had a confidential
relationship with Mrs. Campbell at the relevant time.
In re Estate of Brevard presents a less sophisticated charity
representative than Campbell, but is equally troubling.404 The testator,
Ms. Brevard, allegedly asked Pastor Barlowe to help her prepare a
testament.405 Pastor Barlowe and Ms. Brevard were friends, and she
often attended his church.406 Pastor Barlowe purchased will drafting
software and prepared Ms. Brevard’s testament for her.407 The testament
named Pastor Barlowe as executor and his church as contingent
beneficiary.408 Ms. Brevard’s relatives challenged her will on the

403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.

In re Will of Campbell, 573 S.E.2d 550 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
In re Estate of Brevard, 213 S.W.3d 298 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
Id. at 300.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 301.
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grounds of undue influence.409 On appeal, one issue before the court was
whether Pastor Barlow had a confidential relationship with Ms.
Brevard.410 The court conceded that had Pastor Barlow been an actual
attorney, he and Ms. Brevard would have had a confidential relationship,
as a matter of law, when he prepared her will.411 However, the court was
unwilling to extend that rule to a person engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.412 In the attorney-client context, “heightened scrutiny
exists because attorneys’ superior knowledge of the law is assumed to
give them an unfair advantage when conducting business transactions
with clients.”413 However, the concern in the case of Pastor Barlow was
different in the view of the court. “The danger inherent in the
unauthorized practice of law is not that the unauthorized practitioner will
use superior legal knowledge to take advantage of a ‘client,’ but that the
‘client’ will be harmed by the unauthorized practitioner’s lack of
knowledge.”414 The court’s analysis completely misses the point. The
appropriate inquiry is whether a confidential relationship exists. Where a
non-attorney seeks to act as an attorney, he should be held to the same
legal standard as an attorney.
2. Susceptibility, Opportunity, Disposition, and Coveted Result
In addition to the existence of a confidential relationship, a finding
of undue influence typically requires evidence of susceptibility,
opportunity, disposition, and a coveted result. A successful planned
giving campaign bears the hallmarks of each of these factors, but courts
often refuse to give this fact sufficient evidentiary weight.
a.

Susceptibility

In determining susceptibility, the court asks whether the testator was
susceptible to the influence of the alleged influencer.415 The testator’s
personal qualities are relevant.416 Illness,417 incapacity,418 old age,419
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.

Id.
Id. at 303.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., In re Estate of Dejmal, 289 N.W.2d 813, 821 (Wis. 1980).
See, e.g., In re Estate of Bandurski , 281 A.2d 621, 623 (Del. Ch.1971);
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social isolation, declining mental abilities420 and similar factors all
indicate of susceptibility.421 This vulnerable population is exactly the
population targeted by nonprofit organizations for bequests because they
are the most likely to make those bequests. Planned giving campaigns
are actually designed to make potential donors more susceptible to the
suggestions of the nonprofit and its representatives. Direct mailings and
other early contacts with potential donors help cultivate desires and
soften the ground long before the non-profit’s representative makes
personal contact. Once a non-profit’s representative actually contacts the
testator personally, the testator is more likely to be receptive to the
representative’s suggestions.
Courts, however, are hesitant to recognize this susceptibility to
influence in the charitable context. In In re Estate of Osborn, the
decedent left the bulk of her estate to the local Catholic Diocese.422 The
decedent’s sister brought an unsuccessful undue influence challenge.423
She alleged, among other things, that the testator was “dependent upon
the Clergy as her means of social outlet.”424 The court saw nothing
unusual about the elderly testator’s relationship with and reliance on the
church as her means of social outlet.425
VI. Opportunity
Opportunity is, perhaps, the easiest factor to establish in undue
influence cases. Opportunity simply requires evidence that the alleged
influencer had the opportunity to exercise undue influence. Opportunity
generally requires that the alleged influencer spent a meaningful amount
of time alone with the testator.426 A confidential or familial relationship
Boehm v. Allen, 506 N.W.2d 781, 784 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993); In re Estate of Borsch, 353
N.W.2d 346, 349 (S.D. 1984).
417. Borsch, 353 N.W.2d at 349.
418. Bandurski, 281 A.2d at 624.
419. Borsch, 353 N.W.2d at 350.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. In re Estate of Osborn, 470 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 1117.
426. See, e.g., In re Estate of Schroeder, 441 N.W.2d 527, 532 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989) (“Leslie Schroeder had an opportunity to exercise undue influence because he was
the decedent’s husband, her attorney, and he drafted her will.”); In re Sechrest, 537
S.E.2d 511, 516 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (“The evidence is further undisputed that prior to
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tends to support a finding of opportunity. Involvement in the preparation
of the testament also suggests opportunity. Yet, courts are hesitant to
recognize the existence of opportunity in the charitable context. For
example, in Herman v. Kogan, the court found no opportunity to
overreach on the part of the attorney or charity where (1) the charity’s
attorney prepared the will; (2) the attorney was also the regional
president of the charity; (3) all of the witnesses to the testament were
officers of the charity; (4) the executors named in the will were officers
of the corporation; (5) the will was deposited at the offices of the
corporation; and (6) the attorney apparently did not charge a fee for his
services.427 Despite this overwhelming evidence, the court found the
uninformative, largely irrelevant, and obviously self-serving testimony of
the attorney and other officers of the charity sufficiently compelling to
dispel any presumption of overreaching or undue influence.
VII. Disposition
Disposition requires a finding that the alleged influencer had “a
disposition to influence unduly for the purpose of procuring an improper
favor . . . .”428 “‘Disposition’ means something more than a mere desire
to obtain a share of another’s estate.”429 Rather, disposition “implies a
willingness to do something wrong or unfair, and grasping or
overreaching characteristics.”430 Courts are hesitant to view the actions
of charities and representatives as rising to this level. In Estate of Davis
v. Cook, the decedent left her nearly two million dolars residuary estate
to Schreiner College, the school attended by her long deceased son.431
Schreiner’s development officer began to visit Mrs. Davis in 1994. At
the time, she was ninety-eight-years old, “lonely, isolated, and plagued
with physical infirmities.”432 Schreiner’s development officer offered
estate-planning advice to Mrs. Davis. Schreiner also “made pleas to
[Mrs. Davis] which involved flattery, appeals to patriotism and selfworth, glorification of the memory of her deceased son, and the allure of
Harold’s death, Mowery had little contact with the testatrix and, thus, had virtually no
opportunity to exert his will over hers.”).
427. Herman v. Kogan, 487 So.2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
428. In re Estate of Schaefer, 241 N.W. 382, 385 (Wis. 1932); accord In re Estate
of Stenerson, 348 N.W.2d 141, 143 (N.D. 1984).
429. In re Estate of Brehmer, 164 N.W.2d 318, 322 (Wis. 1969).
430. Id.
431. In re Estate of Davis, 9 S.W.3d 288 (Tex. App. 1999).
432. Id. at 293.

55

1038

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:3

membership in the Schreiner Oaks Society, an honorary society for
Schreiner contributors.”433 The court, however, sustained summary
judgment upholding the will finding that less than “a scintilla of
probative evidence” gave rise to a genuine issue of material fact.434
VIII. Coveted Result
The coveted result element asks “whether [the alleged influencer]
has, for no apparent reason, been favored in the will to the exclusion of a
natural object of the testator’s bounty.”435 Courts typically define
‘natural objects of one’s bounty based upon the particular circumstances
surrounding a case.436 “[O]rdinarily, all things being equal, the natural
objects of a testator’s bounty are those who unless a will exists will
inherit his property.”437 When a testator has no spouse or children,
collateral relatives fall squarely within this description because they are
the testator’s likely heirs in intestacy. When collateral heirs challenge a
bequest made to a charity, however, courts are quick to dismiss the idea
that a collateral heir might be the natural object of the testator’s bounty.
In Estate of Davis v. Cook, for example, the decedent left her nearly $2
million residual estate to charity to the exclusion of collateral relatives.438
In considering the naturalness of the bequest the court explained that
“excluding collateral heirs in favor of charities is not unnatural.”439 The
opinion fails to discuss whether the testator and her collateral relatives
had a close relationship despite the obvious relevance of such an inquiry.
In re Campbell440 is similar. The testator gave the bulk of her estate to a
college rather than her siblings, nieces and nephews.441 The testator had
provided for her family under several prior wills and enjoyed a close
relationship with her family.442 Despite those facts, the court concluded
that her relatives were not the “direct sort of ‘natural objects of her
433. Id. at 294.
434. Id.
435. In re Estate of Dejmal, 289 N.W.2d 813, 821 (Wis. 1980).
436. See, e.g., Norris v. Bristow, 219 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Mo. 1949); L. S. Tellier,
Instructions, in Will Contest, Defining Natural Objects of Testator's Bounty, 11 A.L.R.2d
731, § 1 (1950).
437. Norris, 219 S.W.2d at 370.
438. In re Estate of Davis, 9 S.W.3d 288 (Tex. App. 1999).
439. Id. at 294.
440. In re Will of Campbell, 573 S.E 2d 550 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
441. Id.
442. Id.
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bounty,’” the testator’s “interest in charity was evident . . . .”443 and the
university demonstrated the transaction was “open, fair, and honest.”444
Some courts go further and expressly declare charities to be the natural
objects of a testator’s bounty. In Estate of Overton, the court explained
that the testator’s gratitude to the hospital for the positive outcome from
cataract surgery “made the Minnesota Medical Foundation a natural
object of her bounty . . . .”445
Courts also refuse to recognize the benefits that actually inure to the
benefit of the attorney, executor, or planned giving officer. Burke v.
Kehr is typical.446 Mr. Kehr, the decedent’s attorney, drafted and
witnessed her will. The will appointed Mr. Kehr as her independent
personal representative and, in that capacity, gave him the authority to
distribute the residue of her estate to whatever charitable organizations
he selected. Yet, the court held that there “was no evidence on the
existence of a substantial benefit to Kehr . . . .”447 In the court’s view,
the significant compensation Kehr would receive as personal
representative was immaterial because these were “fees for services.”448
“Such earned fees do not constitute the type of substantial economic
benefit which gives rise to a presumption of undue influence.”449
IX. Conclusion
Throughout the history of the law of wills, society struggled to
strike the appropriate balance between freedom of testation, protection of
families from disinheritance and charitable giving. Intertwined in that
balance was realization that religious organizations possessed the ability
to frustrate both freedom of testation and family protection. Restrains on
charitable bequests existed in our law for many years. However, in
recent years virtually all restraint is gone. Charitable giving certainly
serves a societal good. However, courts and legislatures should
reconsider the deference afforded charitable bequests in the law order to
ensure the appropriate balance is maintained. Especially in light of a
potential “golden age of philanthropy” considered to be a product of an
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.

Id. at 564.
Id.at 559.
In re Estate of Overton, 417 N.W.2d 653, 657 (Minn. 1988).
Burke v. Kehr, 876 S.W.2d 718 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 722.
Id.
Id.
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anticipated generational transfer of wealth, it is particularly important the
safeguards afforded to ensuring testamentary freedom and family
security, particularly by the doctrine of undue influence and the
interested witness rule, begin to shield testators from overreaching
charities within the context of charitable testamentary bequests. The
competing public policies ensuring and providing for testamentary
freedom, family protection and charitable giving should begin to operate
in a way that they provide a checks and balances for one another and
curb the imbalance toward charitable giving which may help to prevent
the mass exploitation of this anticipated generational transfer of wealth
by the nonprofit sector.
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